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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this master thesis is to investigate the relationship between pricing multiples 
and future abnormal returns. An important part of the thesis is to find out whether a strategy 
using multiples as a selection tool can yield positive abnormal returns. 
We analyse all available companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2000-2015. 
Using the method introduced by Fama-MacBeth and a portfolio approach, we investigate six 
different multiples: EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/FCFF, P/E, P/FCFE and P/B.  
During the whole period, only EV/FCFF seems to predict abnormal returns. This result is very 
surprising. Almost all studies find that EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, P/E and P/B predict abnormal 
returns. In search of an explanation of this surprising result, we divided the whole period 
(2000-2015) into two sub-periods, one period before the start of the financial crisis in 2008 
and one period after. 
During the first sub-period (2000-2008), the results are closer to our expectations and more in 
line with prior research. In this period, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/FCFF and P/E seem to 
predict abnormal returns. A lower multiple was associated with higher abnormal returns. 
During the last sub-period (2008-2015), none of the multiples seems to predict abnormal 
returns. These results are quite astonishing. It is an established truth in finance that value stocks 
(low multiples) provide positive abnormal returns.  
We believe that the decrease in the risk-free interest rate from normal to record low levels after 
the financial crisis offers the best explanation of the surprising results. Holding all other 
variables constant, we show that growth stocks (high multiples) should outperform value 
stocks (low multiples) in this environment, as growth stocks are more sensitive to changes in 
the cost of capital.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this master thesis is to analyse the relationship between pricing multiples such 
as price-to-earnings (P/E) and future abnormal equity returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange in 
the years 2000-2015. Investopedia (2015a) gives the following definition of abnormal return: 
“A term used to describe the returns generated by a given security or portfolio over a period 
of time that is different from the expected rate of return. The expected rate of return is the 
estimated return based on an asset pricing model(…)” 
Several studies have found that buying stocks with low multiples yields positive abnormal 
returns. Basu (1977) was one of the first to find a relationship between pricing multiples and 
future abnormal equity returns. He examined the US stock market in the period 1957-1971, 
and found that low P/E stocks outperformed high P/E stocks even after controlling for risk 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Some year later, Fama & French (1992a, 
1993) came to the same conclusion. They also showed that low P/B stocks outperformed high 
P/B stocks.  
We mentioned above that several studies have analysed the relationship between pricing 
multiples and future abnormal returns. However, only a few studies have analysed this 
relationship on the Oslo Stock Exchange. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first 
to analyse the relationship between pricing multiples and future abnormal returns on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange using the following period, multiples and methodology: 
 Including the period 2010-2015 
 Using the EV/FCFF and P/FCFE multiples 
 Using the Fama-MacBeth regression method 
The idea for our master thesis comes from Sparebanken Vest. This clearly indicates that our 
thesis could have value for practitioners. It also indicates that existing studies on pricing 
multiples on the Oslo Stock Exchange do not satisfy the demand. Hence, we believe that our 
thesis is relevant. 
Our research question is: 
Do pricing multiples predict abnormal returns for stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange? 
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We try to answer the research question by analysing six multiples in the period 2000-2015 on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. We analyse EV/EBITDA1, EV/EBIT, P/E and P/B due to their 
popularity among practitioners. EV/FCFF and P/FCFE are analysed due to the strong 
theoretical relationship between free cash flow and value. Due to short sale2 restrictions, we 
assume that it is difficult to implement a short sale strategy for many investors. Hence, we will 
focus on multiples’ ability to predict positive abnormal returns. Based on prior empirical 
studies and economic theory, our hypothesis is that a low (high) multiple predicts positive 
(negative) abnormal returns.  
We try to answer our research question in the following eight chapters: 
Chapter 2 gives the reader some insight into the relevant theory for our master thesis. We 
describe the asset-pricing models we use to calculate the abnormal returns (the CAPM and 
Fama-French three-factor model). Further, we describe “the efficient market hypothesis”. 
According to this hypothesis, stocks with certain characteristics (e.g. low multiples) should 
not consistently outperform other stocks after adjusting for differences in the cost of equity3. 
We try to explain why value stocks (low multiples) historically have outperformed growth 
stocks (high multiples). One possible explanation is that value stocks have higher cost of 
equity (consistent with the efficient market hypothesis). Stocks with higher cost of equity 
should have higher realized returns, as compensation for increased risk. Another possible 
explanation is that value stocks are undervalued by the market. This explanation is in line with 
“behavioural finance” economists claiming that investors are not as rational as required by the 
efficient market hypothesis. In this chapter, we also take a deep dive into the relative valuation 
approach. We describe the key value drivers for each multiple investigated in our thesis, and 
try to predict which multiples that will give the best predictions of abnormal returns. Towards 
the end of this chapter, we present prior studies on the relationship between pricing multiples 
and future returns. 
In chapter 3, we give a detailed description of the data set used in our thesis. 
                                                 
1 Please see the appendix (section 11.12) for a complete description of all the abbreviations used in this thesis 
2 Investopedia (2015b) defines short sale as: “A market transaction in which an investor sells borrowed securities in 
anticipation of a price decline and is required to return an equal number of shares at some point in the future” 
3 The cost of equity is equal to the expected rate of return on equity 
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Chapter 4 describes the two approaches we use to answer our research question. The first 
approach (Fama-MacBeth) combines a cross section regression with a time series regression 
on individual stocks. This approach is used to investigate whether certain factors (e.g. 
systematic risk) are prized on the stock market. In other words, the approach investigates if 
certain factors can explain the cross section of returns. In the second approach (a portfolio 
approach), portfolios are constructed by sorting stocks based on some factor of interest. Then, 
we estimate the abnormal return (alpha) for each portfolio by running a regression. The 
methods in this thesis are mainly based on the papers by Novy-Marx (2010), Fama & French 
(1992a, 1993), and Gray & Vogel (2012). Hence, we use well-known methods that we adapt 
for our dataset.   
In chapter 5, we describe our main findings. Using the Fama-MacBeth approach, we find that 
there is a significant relationship between the value of the EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and 
EV/FCFF multiples and the future CAPM abnormal returns4. As expected, a lower value of 
the multiples was associated with higher abnormal returns. Using the portfolio approach, only 
EV/FCFF seems to predict CAPM and/or Fama-French abnormal returns5 for the whole period 
(2000-2015). This result is very surprising. Almost all studies find that EV/EBITDA, 
EV/EBIT, P/E and P/B predict CAPM abnormal returns. In search of an explanation of this 
surprising result, we divided the whole period into two sub-periods, one period before the start 
of the financial crisis in 2008 and one period after. Before the start of the financial crisis (2000-
2008), EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/FCFF and P/E seem to predict CAPM abnormal returns. 
EV/FCFF also seems to predict Fama-French abnormal returns. As expected, a lower multiple 
was associated with higher abnormal returns. However, after the start of the financial crisis 
(2008-2015), none of the multiples seems to predict CAPM or Fama-French abnormal returns. 
Only the EV/FCFF multiple comes close. In this period, growth stocks (high multiples) 
actually performed marginally better than value stocks (low multiples). These results are quite 
astonishing, and might be of value for portfolio managers following a strategy of buying stocks 
with low multiples. 
                                                 
4 CAPM abnormal return = Gross return less the expected rate of return estimated using the CAPM 
5 Fama-French abnormal return = Gross return less the expected rate of return estimated using the Fama-French three-factor 
model 
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In chapter 6, we try to explain the surprising results after the start of the financial crisis. We 
believe that the decrease in the risk-free interest rate from normal to record low levels after 
the financial crisis offers the best explanation of our surprising results. Holding all other 
variables constant, we show that growth stocks (high multiples) should outperform value 
stocks (low multiples) in this environment, as growth stocks are more sensitive to changes in 
the cost of capital. We also investigate why the low EV/FCFF portfolio outperformed the other 
low multiple portfolios during the whole period. Our analysis indicate that investors have 
penalized companies making large investments over the last couple of years. The low 
EV/FCFF companies may have outperformed the other companies due their low investment 
levels.  
In chapter 7, we investigate the robustness of our results by comparing alternative 
assumptions and methodologies. Our results seem very robust. 
In chapter 8, we investigate our methods with a critical eye and try to identify potential 
sources of error. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the thesis and concludes. We believe that our thesis is relevant and 
could have value due to two factors. Frist, we believe that we are the first to include the period 
2010-2015 in an analysis of the relationship between pricing multiples and future abnormal 
returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We found that the historical relationship between pricing 
multiples and future abnormal returns have faded away during this period. Second, we believe 
that we are the first to investigate the EV/FCFF multiple on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The 
EV/FCFF multiple is the only multiple that seems to predict CAPM and/or Fama-French 
abnormal returns during the whole period (2000-2015). As expected, a lower EV/FCFF 
multiple was associated with higher abnormal returns. For the other multiples we did not find 
a clear relationship between the value of the multiple and future abnormal returns. 
These results indicate that portfolio managers should be wary of basing a portfolio strategy on 
buying stocks with low multiples (value stocks). They also indicate that portfolio managers 
that do base their strategy on buying stocks with low multiples should consider using the 
EV/FCFF multiple as a selection tool. This is the first thesis were you could extract these 
results on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Thus, we believe that this thesis could have value for 
portfolio managers that invest in the Norwegian stock market. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Overview 
In this chapter, we give the reader some insight into the relevant theory for our master thesis. 
We describe the asset-pricing models we use to calculate the abnormal returns. Further, we 
present two essential theories for our thesis: “the efficient market hypothesis” and “the 
behavioural finance theory”. We will also give a description of the relative valuation approach. 
We describe the key value drivers of each multiple investigated in our thesis, and try to predict 
which multiples that will give the best predictions of future abnormal returns. Towards the end 
of this chapter we present the findings of prior studies on the relationship between pricing 
multiples and future abnormal returns. 
2.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
The CAPM is one of the most central models in financial economics. It gives a precise 
prediction of the relationship that we should observe between the risk of an asset and its 
expected return (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011). The model is based on several assumptions. 
We want to highlight two of the most important assumptions. First, all investors must have the 
same information. Second, all investors are mean-variance optimizers, meaning that they want 
to maximize the reward-to-risk ratio (Sharpe ratio) defined as: 
𝐸(𝑆𝑝) =
[𝐸(𝑟𝑝) − 𝑟𝑓]
𝜎𝑝
 
Where 𝐸(𝑆𝑝) is the expected Sharpe ratio for the portfolio, 𝐸(𝑟𝑝) is the expected return on the 
portfolio, 𝑟𝑓 is the return on the risk-free asset, and 𝜎𝑝 is the portfolio standard deviation. 
In the simplified CAPM-world, all investors will choose to hold a portfolio of risky assets in 
proportions that duplicate the market portfolio (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011). The market 
portfolio is the optimal portfolio because it offers the highest risk premium per risk unit 
(Sharpe ratio) of all possible portfolios. The individual investor’s risk aversion decides the 
optimal allocation of capital between the market portfolio and a risk-free asset. The capital 
market line (CML) gives all possible combinations between the market portfolio and the risk-
free asset, and is given by the following equitation: 
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𝐸(𝑟𝑝) = 𝑟𝑓 +
[𝐸(𝑟𝑀) − 𝑟𝑓]
𝜎𝑀
∗ 𝜎𝑝 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐸(𝑆𝑀) ∗ 𝜎𝑝 
Where 𝐸(𝑟𝑝) is the expected return on a portfolio that combines an investment in the risk-free 
asset and the market portfolio. 𝑟𝑓 is the return on the risk-free asset, 𝐸(𝑟𝑀) is the expected 
return on the market portfolio and 𝜎𝑀 is the standard deviation of the market portfolio. 𝜎𝑝 is 
the standard deviation of a portfolio that combines an investment in the risk-free asset and the 
market portfolio, and 𝐸(𝑆𝑀) is the expected Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio. 
Figure 1: Capital Market Line 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the CML is a straight line in the return-standard deviation plane, 
with intercept equal to the risk-free rate and slope equal to the Sharpe ratio. By maximizing 
the Sharpe ratio, investors end up holding the market portfolio. Hence, a passive position in 
the market portfolio is efficient.  
0,0 %
0,2 %
0,4 %
0,6 %
0,8 %
1,0 %
1,2 %
1,4 %
1,6 %
1,8 %
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
Ex
p
ec
te
d
 r
et
u
rn
Standard deviation
Minimum-Variance Frontier Risk free asset Minimum variance portfolio
Capital Market Line Market portfolio Stocks
Indifference curves Optimal asset allocation
The chart above illustrates the process of finding the optimal asset allocation. First, investors try to find the risky 
portfolio that gives the highest return per risk unit (i.e. steepest slope of the Capital Market Line). In the simplified 
CAPM-world, the market portfolio is the optimal risky portfolio. Second, the investor maximizes his utility 
function (represented by indifference curves in the chart) by choosing the optimal allocation of capital between 
the market portfolio and a risk-free asset (Optimal asset allocation). 
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The CML graphs the expected return for efficient portfolios as a function of portfolio standard 
deviation (total risk). The standard deviation is the appropriate risk measure for an investor’s 
overall portfolio. The relevant risk measure for an individual asset however, is not the standard 
deviation. It is instead the asset’s contribution to the portfolio standard deviation. This 
contribution is measured by the asset’s beta (defined below) (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011). 
The security market line (SML) graphs the individual asset’s expected return as a function of 
the asset’s beta, and is given by the following equation: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑀)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑀)
∗ [𝐸(𝑟𝑀) − 𝑟𝑓] = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ [𝐸(𝑟𝑀) − 𝑟𝑓] 
Where, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑀) is the covariance between asset i and the market, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑀) is the 
variance of the market portfolio and 𝛽𝑖 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖,𝑟𝑀)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑀)
 is the asset’s beta.  
Figure 2: Security Market Line 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the SML is a straight line in the return-beta plane with intercept 
equal to the risk-free rate. The SML is valid for both efficient portfolios and individual assets. 
It is the most commonly used model to estimate the cost of equity (Koller, Goedhart, & 
Wessels, 2010). 
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Many empirical studies have questioned the usefulness of the CAPM framework. In a famous 
article in the Journal of Finance, Fama & French (1992a) concluded: “In short, our tests do 
not support the most basic predictions of the SLB (Sharpe-Lintner-Black) Capital Asset 
Pricing Model that average stock returns are positively related to market betas.” Due to the 
lack of empirical support, many studies have tried to expand the CAPM framework with other 
systematic risk factors. We will present some of the most recognized factors in the next 
section. 
2.3 Multifactor models 
The Fama & French Three-Factor Model 
Through a series of articles, Fama & French (1992a, 1993) introduced a three-factor model, 
which they argue is superior to the CAPM. The first factor is the excess market returns (similar 
to the CAPM). The second factor is the excess returns of small firms minus big firms (SMB). 
The third factor is the excess returns of high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market 
stocks (HML)6. A company does not receive a premium for being small, but instead the 
company receives a risk premium if its stock return is positively correlated with those of small 
firms or high book-to-market firms. The three-factor model predicts the following expected 
excess return for asset i: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛽1[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿 
SMB and HML are factors that based on past evidence seem to predict average returns well 
and therefore may be capturing risk premiums. Even though SMB and HML are not obvious 
candidates for relevant risk factors, Fama & French argues that they may proxy for unknown 
unobservable fundamental risk factors. They argue that firms with high book-to-market ratios 
(low P/B) are more likely to be in financial distress, and that small firms may be more sensitive 
to changes in business conditions (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011).  
Ever since the introduction of the three-factor model, most of the academic community have 
relied on it to measure the cost of equity (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). However, many 
have criticized the model since it is purely based on empirical evidence. When researchers 
                                                 
6 High book-to-market is the same as low P/B and low book-to-market is the same as high P/B.  
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scan the database of security returns in search of explanatory variables, they may uncover past 
patterns that are due to pure chance (Black F. , 1993). Multiple papers find that the SMB-effect 
disappeared after 1981 ( (Ang & Chen, 2007), (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010)).  
The graph below illustrates how value stocks (in this case low P/B) have outperformed growth 
stocks (high P/B) since 1926, giving support to the HML factor. The picture is not that clear 
for the SMB factor. Among value firms, small firms have outperformed big firms. However, 
among growth firms, small firms have underperformed big firms. Most of the 
underperformance stems from the period after 1980, giving support to the papers claiming that 
the SMB effect has disappeared after 1981. 
Figure 3: Value stocks vs. growth stocks 
 
A Forth Factor: Momentum 
Jagadeesh & Titman (1993) uncovered a tendency for good or bad performance of stocks to 
persist over several months. This effect is called momentum. Historically, stocks with positive 
momentum have outperformed stocks with negative momentum over the next three to twelve 
months. Based on this empirical result, Carhart (1997) constructed a momentum factor and 
added it to the Fama & French three-factor model. The factor is constructed by taking the 
return of positive momentum stocks over the return of negative momentum stocks. The factor 
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We constructed the graph above using monthly return series for the four portfolios from Kenneth French’s data 
library. Each index is calculated as: Index(t) = 100*([1+r(1)]*[1+r(2)]*…*[1+r(t-1)]*[1+r(t)]), where r(t) is 
the index return in month t. 
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WML factor is not a rational risk factor. It is rather a result of irrational behaviour of investors 
(Døskeland, 2014).  
A Fifth Factor: Liquidity 
Ibbotson, Chen, Kim & Hu (2013) find that illiquid stocks outperform liquid stocks. They 
argue that less liquid stocks may take longer to trade and/or have higher transaction costs. 
Hence, if all else is equal, investors should pay more for liquid stocks, and pay less for illiquid 
stocks.  
2.4 The correct asset-pricing model? 
There is a clear trade-off between the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. The 
CAPM is based on solid theory about risk and return, but lack empirical support. The Fama-
French three-factor model lack solid theory about risk and return, but have great empirical 
support. The problem with the Fama-French three-factor model is that we do not know if the 
SMB and HML factors are true proxies for risk factors, or a result of “data-snooping”. As an 
example of data-snooping, the correlation between the inverse of Brann’s position in the 
national soccer league (Tippeligaen) and the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index was 0.74 
between 1995 and 2008 (see Figure 9 in the appendix). This is clearly a spurious relationship. 
The performance of Brann does not drive the value of companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
or vice versa. However, if we had just focused on the empirical evidence, we would have come 
to the opposite conclusion. As expected, the relationship has faded away over the last couple 
of years (just like the SMB factor). 
The same data-snooping argument holds for the momentum and liquidity factors as well. It is 
hard to tell which of the factors presented above that represents true risk factors and which of 
the factors that are a result of data-snooping. 
All the asset-pricing models presented above have some strengths and weaknesses. 
Practitioners tend to favour the CAPM, while the academic community tend to favour the 
Fama-French three-factor model. As there is no universally agreed upon asset-pricing model, 
we decided to calculate the abnormal returns using both the CAPM and the Fama-French 
three-factor model. If anything, we believe that the use of two different asset-pricing models 
will make our results more robust. 
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If the Fama-French three-factor model is the true model, low P/B stocks will not give abnormal 
returns. Low P/B stocks may give higher returns than high P/B stocks, but not after adjusting 
for differences in the cost of equity. 
2.5 Efficient market hypothesis and “behavioral finance”  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis, developed by Eugene Fama, has implications for whether 
differences in return between firms with high and low multiples are due to mispricing or risk. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices should reflect all available 
information (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011). Therefore, price changes should be random and 
unpredictable. There are three versions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, where the 
hypothesis differ in what they regard as all available information (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 
2011).  
The weak-form hypothesis claims that stock prices reflect all available information that can 
be derived by examining market data such as past prices or trading volume (Bodie, Kane, & 
Marcus, 2011). All technical and trend analysis is therefore useless. If certain patterns emerge, 
investors will find and exploit them, making them disappear. 
The semistrong-form hypothesis states that all publicly available information about the firm, 
in addition to the information under the weak-form, is reflected in the stock price (Bodie, 
Kane, & Marcus, 2011). Thus, a trading strategy based on multiples using market values and 
accounting variables should not yield abnormal return. Low P/E stocks may have higher 
returns than high P/E stocks, but not after adjusting for differences in the cost of equity. 
Lastly, the strong-form states that stock prices reflect information available to company 
insiders, in addition to the information under the semi-strong form (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 
2011). This version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is extreme. Exploiting insider 
information is illegal. Evidence of the strong-form on the Oslo Stock Exchange would 
therefore suggest that a lot of illegal trading take place. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis has received criticism from “behavioural finance” 
economists. They claim that investors’ psychology can lead to irrational behaviour 
(Døskeland, 2014). Research has showed that abnormal returns are correlated with weather 
conditions and results in sporting events. Another example of irrational behaviour is that 
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investors tend to extrapolate trends (Board, 2014). If investors just extrapolate a company’s 
current performance, stocks with currently depressed earnings will be undervalued while 
stocks with currently inflated earnings will be overvalued. 
2.6 Approaches to Valuation 
Three main approaches to valuation 
There are three main approaches to valuing a company. The first is the Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) valuation. In this approach, you value the company by discounting the expected future 
cash flows at the cost of capital. The second is the relative valuation. Then, you value an asset 
by looking at the price of comparable assets relative to a common variable such as earnings or 
cash flow. The third is the contingent claim valuation. Contingent claim valuation use option 
pricing models to value assets with option characteristics (Damodaran, 2012).  
The DCF valuation is the preferred approach of both practitioners and the academic 
community because it relies on the flow of cash in and out of the company, rather than 
accounting-based earnings (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). However, equity researchers 
often use relative valuation to triangulate results. As this thesis uses relative valuation, we 
provide a detailed description of this approach below. 
Relative valuation 
There are two main approaches within the relative valuation approach.  
The first is the relative valuation compared with the company’s own history. In this approach, 
you look at the same multiple for a company over a certain period. Using the price-to-earnings 
multiple (P/E), the basic premise is that you should be willing to pay the same amount for one 
dollar of earnings today as you were willing to pay in the past. If the current multiple is high 
(low) compared with the historical average, it may indicate that the company is overvalued 
(undervalued).  
The second approach is the relative valuation compared with other companies (peers), which 
we use in this thesis. This approach compares the company’s current multiple with other 
companies current multiple. Using the price-to-earnings multiple (P/E), the basic premise is 
that you should be willing to pay the same amount for one dollar of earnings regardless of the 
company generating the earnings. If the current multiple is high (low) compared with the peer 
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average, it may indicate that the company is overvalued (undervalued). However, if the 
fundamental drivers of the multiple differ among the peers, the company may deserve a higher 
(lower) multiple than the peer average. Thus, a key issue for a sound relative valuation is to 
find peers with similar key value drivers (e.g. return on capital, cost of capital and long-term 
growth). Even if you find comparable peers, this approach may lead to poor investment 
decisions. If a stock is 10% undervalued compared with the peers, it does not make the stock 
a good investment if the peers are overvalued by 100%. Nevertheless, if you buy relatively 
undervalued stocks, you may beat a passive position in the market index. Another strategy 
could be to buy undervalued stocks and short overvalued stocks (a long-short strategy). If the 
undervalued stocks fall by less than the overvalued stocks, you will still make money on your 
investment, even if the overall stock market declines. 
What is equal for both approaches is that you should compare the assets relative value to a key 
value driver such as free cash flow or earnings. We also believe that you should use “cyclically 
adjusted” accounting variables in the denominator of the multiples. In their famous book 
Security Analysis (1934), Benjamin Graham & David Dodd noted that one-year earnings were 
too volatile to offer a good idea of the true earning power of a company. Thus, they argued for 
smoothing the company’s earnings using a five our ten-year average. Robert Shiller used this 
approach to calculate his famous cyclically adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE) for the S&P 500 index 
(Shiller, 2015). CAPE is calculated by dividing the price of the S&P 500 index by the 10-year 
moving average of the real earnings per share. In the chart on the next page, we compare the 
cyclically adjusted earnings per share (Cyclically adjusted EPS) with the annual earnings per 
share (EPS): 
Figure 4: Cyclically adjusted EPS 
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The data used in this chart is obtained from Robert Shiller’s homepage (Shiller, 2015).  
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The cyclically adjusted EPS seems to grow at a relatively stable rate. The annual EPS however, 
is highly volatile. In the appendix (section 11.2), we show that the cyclically adjusted EPS 
seems to give a good prediction of the fair value of the index. The price of the index seems to 
fluctuate around 16-17 times the cyclically adjusted EPS. Thus, whenever the price of the 
index is far above (below) 16-17 times the cyclically adjusted EPS, the price tends to decrease 
(increase). The annual EPS seems to give a good prediction of the current price of the index. 
The price of the index is often close to 15-16 times the annual EPS. However, the annual EPS 
does not seem to predict future price movements. This indicates that investors tend to focus 
too much on the current earnings instead of the underlying earnings (cyclically adjusted EPS). 
It also indicates that cyclically adjusted accounting variables give better predictions of future 
returns than unadjusted accounting variables.  
The disadvantage with cyclically adjusting the accounting variables for individual companies 
is that you lose a large portion of the total number of observations. You will lose observations 
for all companies with less than ten years of data if you use a ten-year average to calculate the 
cyclically adjusted earnings. If you compare the relative value of companies in the same 
industry, you will adjust for the industry-specific cycle. Thus, in the relative valuation 
compared with other companies it may be better to use unadjusted accounting variables. 
Most of the academic community use trailing multiples (based on past actual variable values), 
while most practitioners use forward multiples (based on estimated future variable values). 
The advantage with trailing multiples is that the variables are observable and do not have to 
be estimated. The advantage with forward multiples is that they are usually normalized, 
ignoring large one-time charges or gains (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). However, both 
trailing and forward multiples can deviate from their cyclically adjusted values. 
2.7 The key value drivers of each multiple 
2.7.1 Introduction 
In this sub-chapter (2.7), we give the reader some insight into the key value drivers of each 
multiple investigated in our thesis. The main insight from this sub-chapter is that you have to 
make many assumptions if you are going to value a company using the relative valuation 
approach. The abbreviations and formulas in this sub-chapter are based on Koller, Goedhart 
& Wessels (2010). 
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2.7.2 Enterprise multiples 
We define enterprise multiples as multiples with enterprise value in the numerator. In the 
denominator, you should use variables that are attributable to the whole enterprise (both debt 
and equity investors). 
In the appendix (section 11.4), we show that the enterprise value of a company with constant 
return on new invested capital (RONIC) and growth going forward is given by the key value 
driver formula: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
Where 𝐸𝑉𝑡 is the enterprise value year t, 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 is the Free Cash Flow to the Firm year t+1, 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, and 𝑔 is the long-term growth rate of 
NOPLAT. 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 is the Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes year t+1, and 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 
is the Return on New Invested Capital. 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 is the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes year 
t+1, and 𝑡 is the tax rate. (
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
) is the net investment rate (i.e. the proportion of NOPLAT 
that has to be invested back into the firm to achieve a growth rate equal to the long-term growth 
rate (g)). 
We admit that this formula is very restrictive, as it assumes constant RONIC and growth rate 
in perpetuity. Nevertheless, we believe that the formula can be useful in identifying the key 
value drivers of the different multiples. 
Be aware that the formulas in this section (2.7.2) are only valid if the cost of capital (WACC) 
is greater than the long-term growth rate (g).  
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EV/EBIT 
In the appendix (section 11.4), we show that the key value driver formula for the “Enterprise 
value” to “Earnings Before Interest and Taxes” (EV/EBIT) multiple is given by the following 
equations: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1
=
(1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1
=
(1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
] 
The second equation is derived in order to isolate the effect of long-term growth (g) on the 
EV/EBIT multiple. 
Holding all other variables constant, the EV/EBIT multiple is an increasing function of: 
 The return on new invested capital (RONIC) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONIC is greater than WACC 
Holding all other variables constant, the EV/EBIT multiple is a decreasing function of: 
 The tax rate 
 The cost of capital (WACC) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONIC is less than WACC 
The EV/EBIT multiple adjusts for differences in revenues, operating expenses and 
maintenance investments7. EBIT is also one of the least volatile accounting variables. Thus, 
EBIT is often relatively close to the cyclically adjusted value. However, the multiple does not 
adjust for differences in the tax rate (t), net investment rate (g/RONIC), cost of capital 
(WACC) or long-term growth rate (g). Thus, companies with different values for these 
variables should have a different EV/EBIT multiple.  
  
                                                 
7 Assuming that the accounting depreciation is a good proxy for maintenance investments 
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Note that a higher return on new invested capital always leads to a higher fair EV/EBIT 
multiple. This is not the case for growth. When the return on new invested capital is higher 
than cost of capital, higher growth creates value. However, when the return on new invested 
capital is lower than the cost of capital, higher growth destroys value. Thus, when the return 
on new invested capital is lower than the cost of capital, the company should not make new 
investments. If the return on new invested capital is equal to the cost of capital, higher growth 
neither creates nor destroys value. Thus, higher growth is only good if the new investments 
generate a satisfactory rate of return. A higher tax rate always leads to a lower fair EV/EBIT 
multiple.  
The most relevant thing to note regarding our research question is the fact that a higher cost 
of capital (WACC) leads to a lower fair EV/EBIT multiple. Consider two companies that have 
the same tax rate (t), net investment rate (g/RONIC) and long-term growth (g). The only 
difference is that one of the companies have higher risk, and therefore a higher cost of capital 
(WACC). The key value driver formula tells us that the stock with the higher cost of capital 
should have a lower EV/EBIT multiple. The higher cost of capital will also result in a higher 
expected return, as compensation for the increased risk. In this situation, pricing multiples do 
predict future returns. However, pricing multiples do not predict future abnormal returns. 
Stocks with low multiples (high cost of capital) will have high returns, while stocks with high 
multiples (low cost of capital) will have low returns. However, the difference in return is only 
a compensation for the difference in the cost of capital. The cost of capital can be estimated 
using an asset-pricing model like the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model.  
The investor community often refers to stocks with high multiples as “growth stocks”. Based 
on the formula above, we notice that this label can be misleading. A high multiple is not 
necessarily a result of high growth. The high multiple could also be explained by a high return 
on new invested capital, a low cost of capital or a low tax rate. Further, higher growth only 
leads to a higher fair multiple if the return on new invested capital is higher than the cost of 
capital. The investor community often refers to stocks with low multiples as “value stocks”. 
This label makes more sense as investors only have to pay a low price for the current value of 
a key value driver such as earnings or free cash flow. 
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EV/EBITDA 
In the appendix (section 11.4), we show that the key value driver formula for the “Enterprise 
value” to “Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization” (EV/EBITDA) 
multiple is given by the following equations: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
=
(1 −
𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
) ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
= [
(1 −
𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
) ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
] ∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
] 
Where 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 is the depreciation and amortization expense year t+1. 
The second equation is derived in order to isolate the effect of long-term growth (g) on the 
EV/EBITDA multiple. 
Holding all other variables constant, the EV/EBITDA multiple is an increasing function of: 
 The return on new invested capital (RONIC) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONIC is greater than WACC 
Holding all other variables constant, the EV/EBITDA multiple is a decreasing function of: 
 Depreciation and amortization as a portion of EBITDA 
 The tax rate 
 The cost of capital (WACC) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONIC is less than WACC. 
In the derivation above, we assume that accounting depreciation is a good proxy for 
maintenance investments. 
The only difference between the EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT multiple is that the EV/EBITDA 
multiple does not take into account differences in the depreciation rate (depreciation expense 
measured as a portion of EBITDA). So why should you use the EV/EBITDA multiple if the 
only difference between the EV/EBITDA and the EV/EBIT multiple is that you have to make 
one additional assumption using the EV/EBITDA multiple? 
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For companies with justified differences in the depreciation rate (e.g. different capital 
intensity) it does not make much sense to use the EV/EBITDA multiple instead of the 
EV/EBIT multiple. 
For companies with unjustified differences in the depreciation rate (e.g. the same capital 
intensity, but different accounting depreciation), we prefer the EV/EBITDA multiple over the 
EV/EBIT multiple. In this situation, accounting depreciation is not a good proxy for 
maintenance investments. 
EV/FCFF 
In the appendix (section 11.4), we show that the key value driver formula for the “Enterprise 
value” to “Free Cash Flow to the Firm” (EV/FCFF) multiple is given by the following 
equation: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
=
1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
Holding all other variables constant, the EV/FCFF multiple is an increasing function of: 
 The long-term growth rate (g) 
Holding all other variables constant, the EV/FCFF multiple is a decreasing function of: 
 The cost of capital (WACC) 
The EV/FCFF multiple adjusts for all the components of the free cash flow; revenues, 
operating expenses, tax rate, maintenance investments and net investments. However, the 
multiple does not take into account differences in the cost of capital (WACC) or long-term 
growth rate (g). FCFF is calculated as: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 − ∆𝑂𝑝𝑊𝐶𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡+1
= 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 − 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1                            
= 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 
Where 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 is the depreciation and amortization year t+1, ∆𝑂𝑝𝑊𝐶𝑡+1 is the change in 
operating working capital year t+1, and 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 is the capital expenditure year t+1.  
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Changes in operating working capital and capital expenditure are often much more volatile 
than changes in NOPLAT and depreciation. Thus, we fear that that the FCFF measure is too 
volatile to give a precise estimate of the relative value of companies. We believe that FCFF 
often deviates significantly from the cyclically adjusted value. 
2.7.3 Equity multiples 
We define equity multiples as multiples with equity value in the numerator. In the 
denominator, you should use variables that are attributable to equity investors only. 
In the appendix (section 11.5), we show that the equity value per share of a company with 
constant return on new equity investments (RONE) and growth going forward is given by the 
key value driver formula for equity: 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝐸𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
Where 𝑃𝑡 is the value per share year t. 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 is the Free Cash Flow to Equity per share year 
t+1, 𝑘 is the cost of equity and 𝑔 is the long-term growth rate in earnings per share. 𝐸𝑡+1 is the 
earnings per share year t+1, and 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 is the Return On New Equity investments. (
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
) is 
the net investment rate (i.e. the proportion of the earnings per share that has to be invested 
back into the firm to achieve a growth rate equal to the long-term growth rate (g)). 
The great disadvantage with equity multiples compared with enterprise multiples is that equity 
multiples are affected by the company’s capital structure. In the appendix (section 11.6), we 
show that the company’s capital structure (debt-to-equity ratio) will affect both the return on 
equity (ROE) and cost of equity (k). Thus, you should not compare the relative value of 
companies with different leverage (i.e. the vast majority). 
Be aware that the formulas in this section (2.7.3) are only valid if the cost of equity (k) is 
greater than the long-term growth rate (g).  
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P/E 
In the appendix (section 11.5), we show that the key value driver formula for the price-to-
earnings (P/E) multiple is given by the following equations: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡+1
=
(1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡+1
=
1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
] 
The second equation is derived in order to isolate the effect of long-term growth (g) on the P/E 
multiple. 
Holding all other variables constant, the P/E multiple is an increasing function of: 
 The return on new equity investments (RONE) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONE is greater than the cost of equity (k) 
Holding all other variables constant, the P/E multiple is a decreasing function of: 
 The cost of equity (k) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONE is less than the cost of equity (k). 
The P/E multiple takes into account differences in revenues, operating expenses, financial 
expenses, tax rate and maintenance investments. However, it does not take into account 
differences in the net investment rate (g/RONE), cost of equity (k) or long-term growth rate 
(g). We also believe that the earnings per share is more volatile than EBITDA and EBIT. Thus, 
we believe that the earnings per share is less likely to be close to the cyclically adjusted value. 
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P/FCFE 
In the appendix (section 11.5), we show that the key value driver formula for the “Price” to 
“Free Cash Flow to Equity per share” (P/FCFE) multiple is given by the following equation: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1
=
1
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
Holding all other variables constant, the P/FCFE multiple is an increasing function of: 
 The long-term growth rate (g) 
Holding all other variables constant, the P/FCFE multiple is a decreasing function of: 
 The cost of equity (k) 
The P/FCFE multiple adjusts for all the components of the free cash flow to equity; revenues, 
operating expenses, financial expenses, tax rate, maintenance investments and net 
investments. However, the multiple does not take into account differences in the cost of equity 
(k) or long-term growth rate (g). We believe that the FCFE is even more volatile than the 
FCFF. FCFE is calculated as: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) + ∆𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
The increase/decrease in net debt can be relatively large. Thus, we fear that that this measure 
is too volatile to give a precise estimate of the relative value of companies. We believe that 
FCFE often deviates significantly from the cyclically adjusted value. 
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P/B 
The “Price” to “Book value of equity per share” (P/B) multiple is a different kind of multiple 
compared with the other multiples. Instead of measuring how much investors are willing to 
pay per dollar of earnings or cash flow, the P/B multiple measures how much investors are 
willing to pay per dollar of equity capital in the firm. In the appendix (section 11.5), we show 
that the key value driver formula for the P/B multiple is given by the following equations: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
=
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
=
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
] 
The second equation is derived in order to isolate the effect of long-term growth (g) on the 
P/B multiple. 
Holding all other variables constant, the P/B multiple is an increasing function of: 
 The return on equity (ROE) 
 The return on new equity investments (RONE) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONE is greater than the cost of equity (k) 
Holding all other variables constant, the P/B multiple is a decreasing function of: 
 The cost of equity (k) 
 The long-term growth rate (g) if RONE is less than the cost of equity (k). 
The P/B multiple does not take into account differences in the return on equity (ROE), net 
investment rate (g/RONE), cost of equity (k) or long-term growth rate (g). The great advantage 
with the P/B multiple is that the book value is very stable and often equal to the cyclically 
adjusted value. 
Naturally, your willingness to pay for one dollar of the equity capital is highly dependent on 
the quality of the equity capital, measured as the return on equity (ROE). Holding all other 
variables constant, we notice that there is a perfect linear relationship between the fair P/B 
multiple and ROE. Thus, if you believe that the company’s current ROE will converge to the 
peer average, the P/B multiple is an ideal multiple. If you do not believe that the company’s 
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current ROE will converge to the peer average, you should not use the P/B ratio to compare 
the relative value of companies. Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2010) find a high level of 
persistency in companies’ return on invested capital. We believe that the same pattern holds 
for the return on equity. Thus, it may not be a realistic assumption to assume that the 
company’s current ROE will converge to the peer average.  
2.7.4 Summary 
Table 1: Summary multiples 
 
2.8 Pricing multiples and future returns 
We have identified four possible explanations for the variation in multiples across companies. 
The different explanations have different implications for multiples’ ability to predict future 
returns. We will exemplify the explanations by investigating the key value driver formula for 
the P/E multiple: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡+1
=
(1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
Where 𝑃𝑡 is the value per share year t and 𝐸𝑡+1 is the earnings per share year t+1. 𝑔 is the 
long-term growth rate in earnings per share, 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 is the Return On New Equity investments, 
and 𝑘 is the cost of equity.  
Multippel Description Assume equal Pros and cons
EV = Enterprise Value WACC + Few assumptions
FCFF = Free Cash Flow to firm Growth rate ‒ FCFF could deviate a lot from cyclical adjusted value
EV = Enterprise Value WACC + EBIT is closer to cyclical adjusted value than FCFF
EBIT = Earninings Before - Growth rate ‒ More assumptions than EV/FCFF
Interest and Taxes Tax rate
Net investment rate
EV = Enterprise Value WACC + Removes the problem with unjustified
EBITDA= Earninings Before - Growth rate differences in the depriciation rate
Interest, Taxes, Depriciation - Tax rate + Less negative values
and Amortization Net investment rate ‒ A lot of assumptions
Depriciation rate
P = Price Cost of equity + Few assumptions
FCFE = Free Cash Flow to Equity Growth rate ‒ FCFE could deviate a lot from cyclical adjusted value
‒ Affected by the company's capital structure
P = Price Cost of equity + Earnings is closer to cyclical adjusted value than FCFE
E = Earnings per share Growth rate ‒ Assumes equal investment rate
Net investment rate ‒ Affected by the company's capital structure
P = Price Cost of equity + Book value is stable and close to cyclical adjusted value
B = Book value per share Growth rate ‒ Much of the variation in P/B is due to variation
Net investment rate in ROE
ROE ‒ Affected by the company's capital structure
P/FCFE
P/E
P/B
EV/FCFF
EV/EBIT
EV/EBITDA
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1) Low (high) P/E stocks are undervalued (overvalued):  
Based on the key value driver formula for the P/E ratio, we notice several possible explanations 
that are consistent with the notion that low P/E stocks are undervalued. First, investors 
underestimate the return on new equity investments (RONE) or long-term growth8 (g) for low 
P/E stocks. Second, investors overestimate the cost of equity (k) for low P/E stocks. Third, 
weak investor sentiment may push the share price far below its fair value for low P/E stocks. 
As time goes by, investors may discover the mispricing and rush to buy the undervalued 
stocks, resulting in increased share prices and positive abnormal returns. These explanations 
are in line with the behavioural finance theory. In this situation, pricing multiples do predict 
abnormal returns. 
We would like to mention that that the relationship between multiples and future returns could 
be the opposite, i.e. that growth stocks (high multiples) are undervalued and value stocks (low 
multiples) are overvalued. Based on prior studies we find this unlikely. If investors 
misestimate the key value drivers, undervalued companies will have a relatively low multiple, 
while overvalued companies will have a relatively high multiple (compared with the fair 
multiple). Then, companies with a relatively low multiple should yield positive abnormal 
returns, while companies with a relatively high multiple should yield negative abnormal 
returns. A similar intuitive explanation indicating that growth stocks are undervalued and 
value stocks overvalued is difficult to produce. Investors tend to extrapolate trends. Thus, it is 
more likely that investors undervalue stocks with currently depressed performance and 
overvalue stocks with currently inflated performance. 
2) Low (high) P/E stocks have higher (lower) cost of equity 
Holding all other variables constant, the key value driver formula tells us that a stock with a 
higher cost of equity should have a lower P/E multiple. The higher cost of equity will also 
result in a higher expected return, as compensation for the increased risk. This explanation is 
in line with the efficient market hypothesis. In this situation, pricing multiples do predict 
returns. However, pricing multiples do not predict abnormal returns. Stocks with low 
multiples (high cost of equity) will have high returns, while stocks with high multiples (low 
cost of equity) will have low returns. However, the difference in return is only a compensation 
                                                 
8 We assume that the return on new equity investments is higher than the cost of equity. Then, higher growth leads to a higher 
fair multiple. 
 34
for the difference in the cost of equity. The question is as always, what is the appropriate 
measure of risk (cost of equity), the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model or any other 
asset-pricing model? 
3) The variation in multiples across companies is explained by different values of the key 
value drivers other than the cost of equity 
In this situation, pricing multiples do not predict abnormal returns nor returns. 
4) The variation in multiples across companies is explained by a volatile denominator in 
the multiple that is different from the cyclically adjusted value 
The fair value of a company is driven by the cyclically adjusted value of the free cash flows. 
Consider two companies that have a fair P/E value of 10 and cyclically adjusted earnings per 
share of 10 dollars. Then, both companies should trade at a price around 100 dollars. However, 
if the annual earnings per share is very volatile and fluctuates randomly between 5 dollars and 
20 dollars, the unadjusted P/E ratio will fluctuate between 20 and 5. Then, the P/E ratio is too 
volatile to give a precise estimate of the relative value of companies. In this situation, pricing 
multiples do not predict abnormal returns nor returns. 
Theoretical conclusion  
Situation 1 and 2 above can explain why value stocks historically have outperformed growth 
stocks (as shown in Figure 3). We believe that the true situation is a combination of all four 
situations above. Thus, we do believe that pricing multiples can provide some information 
about future abnormal returns. The best predictors of abnormal returns would be the multiples 
with few assumptions and accounting variables with low volatility close to the cyclically 
adjusted value. 
2.9 Literature overview  
Investing in companies with low multiples is often called value investing. Value investing 
originates among others from the ideas of Benjamin Graham & David Dodd, which they made 
public through their book, Security Analysis (1934). By looking at firm fundamentals and 
comparing it with the market values, they discovered that it was possible to earn abnormal 
returns. Benjamin Graham later wrote the Intelligent investor (1949) on the same topic, which 
Warren Buffet (one of the world’s most successful investors of the 20th century) has described 
as “the best book about investing ever written” (Wikipedia, 2015a).  
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Basu (1977) was one of the first to examine value investing in light of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) & Black (1972) and the efficient market hypothesis 
of Eugene F. Fama (1970). He sorted stocks on P/E and found that low P/E stocks 
outperformed high P/E stocks with 4.5% per year after adjusting for risk during the period 
1957-1971 in the US. Even though these findings were not consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis, he could not reject the hypothesis due to exclusion of transaction costs, search 
costs and tax effects. 
Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid & Lanstein (1985) found a negative relationship 
between P/B and average return in the US. Chan, Hamaoa & Lakonishok (1991) examined the 
Japanese stock market in the period 1971-1988, and found a significant relationship between 
P/E, market capitalization (market cap), cash flow multiple (Market cap/FCFF), P/B and 
abnormal returns.  A lower multiple increased the abnormal return.  
Fama & French (1992a, 1993, 1996, 1998) analysed the relationship between P/B, P/E, P/D 
(price-to-dividend), P/C (price-to-cash flow) and CAPM abnormal return. They discovered 
that stocks with low multiples (value stocks) had higher returns than stocks with high multiples 
(growth stocks). For the period 1975-1995, a global portfolio consisting of value stocks 
outperformed growth stocks with 7.86% per year (Fama & French, 1998). In addition to this, 
Fama & French (1998) found that value stocks outperformed growth stocks in 12 out of 13 
markets.  
Based on their finding in 1992, Fama & French formulated the three-factor model (1993, 
1996), which they later expanded to a five factor model (2014). As mentioned earlier, Fama 
& French believe that using multiples is just a way of extracting the expected return from the 
stock price. Due to the stability of the book value, they chose P/B to represent the risk factor 
associated with investing in stocks with low multiples (Fama & French, Q&A, 2011). 
However, Fama & French points out that one pricing multiple is just as good as another: “We 
always emphasize that different price ratios are just different ways to scale a stock's price with 
a fundamental, to extract the information in the cross-section of stock prices about expected 
returns. One fundamental (book value, earnings, or cashflow) is pretty much as good as 
another for this job, and the average return spreads produced by different ratios are similar 
to and, in statistical terms, indistinguishable from one another. We like BtM because the book 
value in the numerator is more stable over time than earnings or cashflow, which is important 
for keeping turnover down in a value portfolio” (Fama & French, Q&A, 2011).  
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Loughran & Wellman (2011) created an enterprise multiple factor by buying low EV/EBITDA 
stocks and selling high EV/EBITDA stocks. The enterprise multiple factor gave an abnormal 
return of 1.92% per year after controlling for risk using the Carhart four-factor model (the 
Fama-French three-factor model plus momentum). Loughran & Wellman claim that low 
EV/EBITDA stocks have higher cost of capital than high EV/EBITDA stocks and hence give 
higher returns.   
Gray & Vogel (2012) compared the performance of different multiples in the period 1971-
2010. They sorted stocks on P/B, P/E, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/FCF and EV/Gross-profit 
and evaluated the performance of the different portfolios. Over the 40-year period in the US, 
Gray & Vogel found that EV/EBITDA has been the best selection tool to predict abnormal 
returns. Low EV/EBITDA firms gave an abnormal return of 2.91% per year after adjusting for 
risk using the Fama-French factors. They got similar results using the EV/EBIT multiple. 
Gray & Vogel (2012) also tried using forward earnings obtained from analysts and normalized 
accounting variables. The normalisation was done by taking a five-year average of the 
accounting variable. The portfolio consisting of low P/E stocks based on forward earning did 
considerably worse than all other measures: “The evidence suggests that investors should be 
weary of using forward earnings estimates in their valuation toolkit.” (Gray & Vogel, 2012). 
Gray & Vogel did not find evidence of improvement using normalisation either. “If anything, 
the evidence suggests that the one-year valuation measure is superior to normalized metrics.” 
(Gray & Vogel, 2012). 
There have also been conducted some research on the relationship between pricing multiples 
and future abnormal returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Egeberg & Enge (2009) sorted 
stocks into portfolios based on the four multiples P/SALES, P/BOK, P/EBIT and P/EBITDA. 
They found that stocks with low P/B, P/EBIT or P/EBITDA outperformed the market. Rettedal 
(2012) found that stocks with low P/B outperformed stocks with a high P/B in the period 1994-
2012. Ødegaard (2015a) calculated the HML factor for Oslo Stock Exchange (low P/B stocks 
minus high P/B stocks) and found that it has given a positive return in the period 1980-2012. 
Internationally, the evidence that multiples predict future CAPM abnormal returns is 
overwhelming. Several studies have shown that EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, P/E and P/B predict 
CAPM abnormal returns. EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT also seem to have the ability to predict 
Fama-French abnormal returns, while the abnormal returns using P/E and P/B disappear when 
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adjusting for risk using the Fama-French model. In all studies presented above, a lower 
multiple was associated with higher returns. We expect to see the same pattern in Norway. 
The EV/FCFF and P/FCFE multiples have not received a lot of attention internationally nor 
domestic. Thus, our expectations for the EV/FCFF and P/FCFE multiples are mainly based on 
the theoretical discussion above. 
2.10 Our preferred multiple 
Based on the theoretical analysis and the literature presented above, we rank the multiples’ 
expected ability to predict abnormal returns from 1 (best) to 6 (worst): 
1. EV/EBIT 
We believe that the EV/EBIT multiple offers the best trade-off between relevance for 
the value of the firm and low volatility of the accounting variable.  
 
2. EV/EBITDA 
We consider the EV/EBITDA multiple almost as good as the EV/EBIT multiple. 
However, the EV/EBITDA multiple does not take into account differences in expected 
maintenance investments. Thus, we rank the EV/EBITDA multiple below the 
EV/EBIT multiple. 
 
3. EV/FCFF 
The EV/FCFF multiple is the most relevant measure for the value of the company. 
However, we fear that the FCFF measure is too volatile to give a precise estimate of 
the relative value of companies. Thus, we rank the EV/FCFF multiple below both 
EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA. 
 
4. P/E 
The major flaw of the P/E multiple compared with the EV/EBIT multiple is that the 
P/E multiple does not take into account differences in leverage. Thus, you should not 
compare the P/E multiple for companies with different capital structure. We also 
believe that the earnings per share measure is more volatile than EBIT. 
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5. P/FCFE 
P/FCFE is the most relevant measure for the equity value per share. However, we fear 
that the FCFE measure is too volatile to give a precise estimate of the relative value of 
companies. Thus we rank the P/FCFE below the P/E multiple. 
 
6. P/B 
The major problem with the P/B multiple is that it does not adjust for differences in 
the return on equity. If you use this multiple to compare the value of companies, you 
assume that every dollar of equity capital in the firm is worth the same across 
companies. However, you should be willing to pay more for a company that returns 15 
dollars for every 100 dollars of equity capital than for a company that only returns 10 
dollars for every 100 dollars of equity capital. The great advantage with the P/B 
multiple is that the equity capital (book value) is very stable and often equal to the 
cyclically adjusted value. If you believe that the company’s current ROE will converge 
to the peer average, the P/B multiple is an ideal multiple. The multiple may also 
identify companies with currently depressed (inflated) ROE that is undervalued 
(overvalued) by the market. 
Based on the theoretical discussion and literature presented above, we believe that all multiples 
can predict abnormal returns. We expect a lower multiple to increase the abnormal return.  
Table 2: Theoretical conclusion 
 
 
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
     
Relationship between multiples and abnormal returns?
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3. Data 
3.1 Dataset 
Our dataset consists of all available stocks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 
1998-2015. All companies that have been delisted, listed or gone bankrupt are included. 
Hence, we correct for survivorship bias. Market data such as the returns and market 
capitalization of stocks are obtained monthly, while accounting data like EBIT is obtained on 
a yearly basis. We used Bloomberg and the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo børs, 2015a) as sources 
to get an overview of the stocks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. In addition, we have used 
the following sources for data: 
 Bloomberg: market (monthly) and accounting data (yearly), see the appendix for a 
definition of the variables (Bloomberg, 2015).  
 Kenneth R. French’s homepage: Fama-French factors and portfolios based on P/E and 
P/B using monthly returns (Kenneth R. French, 2015).  
 Bernt Arne Ødegaard: Fama-French factors for the Norwegian market using monthly 
returns (Ødegaard, 2015b). 
 Robert J. Shiller: Cyclically adjusted earnings per share (yearly) and P/E (yearly) for 
the S&P 500 index (Shiller, 2015). 
 IMF: Inflation (yearly) and GDP forecasts (yearly) (IMF, 2015). 
3.2 Sample period 
Our dataset on the Oslo Stock Exchange starts in January 1998 and ends in January 2015. Due 
to our exclusion criteria (see below), we could not start the Fama-MacBeth approach before 
January 2000. We chose to start our analysis in October 2000, so we could start at a peak in 
order to analyse two complete recessions and one complete expansion period. Our data set 
includes two major stock market declines, namely the burst of the IT-bubble in 2000 and the 
financial crisis in 2008. Further, our dataset includes a whole expansion period from 2003 to 
2008. We cannot yet say whether the period 2008-2015 is a full cycle.  
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In the portfolio analysis, we analyse three periods. First, we analyse the entire period from 
October 2000 to January 2015. Then, we divide the whole period into two sub-periods. The 
first sub-period starts in October 2000 and ends in May 2008. The second sub-period starts in 
May 2008 and ends in January 2015. We chose May 2008 as the cut-off date, partly because 
it was the stock market peak before the financial crisis in 2008. In the Fama-Macbeth analysis, 
we will only look at the entire period.  
3.3 Screening of the data 
3.3.1 General screening 
In our empirical tests, we exclude all financial firms as was done by Fama & French (1992a). 
“We exclude financial firms because the high leverage that is normal for these firms probably 
does not have the same meaning as for non-financial firms, where high leverage more likely 
indicates distress” (Fama & French, 1992a). As a robustness test, we have also done our 
analysis including financial firms, without major differences in the results (see section 7.3).  
As Egeberng & Enge (2009), we gave stocks that went bankrupt a return of -100% in the 
month of bankruptcy. When a company goes bankrupt, the value of equity is zero. Thus, all 
equity investors will get a return of -100%.9 
As Fama & French (1992a) and Loughran & Wellman (2011), we exclude observations with 
negative multiples, both due to negative values in the denominator and in the numerator. 
Collins, Maydew & Weiss (1997) show that the predictability of multiples decline when you 
include negative multiples. Further, researchers do not agree on the classification of stocks 
with negative multiples. Some consider them as growth stocks, while others consider them as 
value stocks (Loughran & Wellman, 2011). Due to these issues, we chose to exclude stocks 
with negative multiples.  
  
                                                 
9 The low multiple portfolios performed marginally better when we did not give companies that went bankrupt a return of -
100 %.   
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Firms that do not have the required information for a certain multiple are excluded from the 
analysis in the following portfolio year (July year t to June year t+1). As missing values differ 
among the different multiples, so does the available stocks for each multiple. An alternative 
could be to only include a stock if it fulfils all the exclusion criteria for all the multiples. Due 
to an already small sample size, we chose to include as many stocks as possible for the different 
multiples, even though this makes our results less comparable across multiples. If missing 
multiples are randomly distributed, it should not affect our results. In chapter 7, we analyse 
the different multiples using the exact same sample.  
As described below, the Fama-MacBeth and the portfolio approach use some additional 
screening criteria that differ from each other. This is mainly due to the practical 
implementation of the two approaches.   
3.3.2 Fama-MacBeth screening  
In the Fama-MacBeth analysis, only stocks with returns for the past 24 months are included. 
We add this restriction because we want to calculate the betas using no less than 24 months of 
data. Otherwise, the dataset is identical to that described in section 3.3.1 
3.3.3 Portfolio screening 
In order to avoid very illiquid stocks, we only include stocks that have been traded at least 9 
out of the 12 last months before portfolio formation. The stock must have an average turnover 
of minimum NOK 1m per month over the last year (July year t-1 to June year t). Moreover, 
the stock must have a market capitalization and be traded in June year t. Our exclusion criteria 
are not very strict. However, they make sure of that the stocks included in the portfolios have 
a minimum degree of liquidity, that they can be traded without major difficulties. Otherwise, 
the dataset is identical to that described in section 3.3.1. In the table below, you can see how 
many stocks that satisfied the inclusion criteria for the different multiples each year compared 
with the total number of stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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Table 3: Number of stocks satisfying the inclusion criteria 
 
3.4 Time series variables 
Risk-free rate    
As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we use the yield on 12 months Norwegian treasury bills. It is 
natural to use 12 months, due to our 12 months investment horizon. For the portfolios, the 
risk-free rate is set equal to the yield on June 30th in year t for the portfolio year (July year t to 
June year t+1). Then, the risk-free rate represent the risk-free alternative cost of investing in 
the portfolios for a year: 
   𝑟𝑓,𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦−𝐴𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑠𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑓,𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒)
1
12 − 1  
In the Fama-MacBeth analysis, the risk-free rate is set equal to the yield at the start of each 
month: 
 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1)
1
12 − 1. 
Market 
As a proxy for the market, we chose to use the OSEBX index. According to the Oslo Stock 
Exchange homepage, OSEBX consists of 54 stocks and is supposed to be an investable index 
Year Oslo Stock Exchange EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
2000 215 70 67 26 83 60 125
2001 213 71 69 18 71 49 125
2002 204 64 57 27 58 44 110
2003 179 54 44 25 46 33 94
2004 189 81 63 30 68 47 110
2005 220 80 67 30 86 31 129
2006 230 99 94 44 102 43 135
2007 242 102 96 33 105 45 158
2008 225 134 120 39 117 55 175
2009 209 118 102 40 84 64 156
2010 206 110 88 45 85 54 147
2011 198 105 90 40 75 49 134
2012 194 106 93 35 77 55 127
2013 186 98 90 39 69 65 117
2014 185 96 84 47 76 70 111
Stocks satisfying the inclusion criteria for the different multiples
All non-financial firms with a positive multiple, that have a market capitalization and return in June year t, 
an average turnover of NOK1m over the last 12 months and have been traded 9 out of the last 12 months are 
included in the portfolios.  
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tracking the performance of the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo børs, 2015b). Since we are 
excluding financial firms, an alternative could be to use an index without financial firms. 
However, we believe that it is easier to compare with a well-known index. Below you can see 
a comparison of two indexes composed of all the stocks in our sample (with and without 
financial firms) and the OSEBX. The graph shows the monthly cumulative return for the 
period October 2000 to January 2015. We can see that the difference between OSEBX and the 
value-weighted indexes is relatively small.   
Figure 5: OSEBX vs. market 
 
Fama-French factors 
Using our sample, we created Fama-French factors for the Oslo Stock Exchange following the 
Fama-French methodology (1993).  
All firms (including financial firms) with a positive book value in December year t-1 that 
fulfils the screening criteria in section 3.3.3 are sorted into six groups based on the market 
capitalizations in June year t and the book-to-market values in December year t-1 (see the table 
below). Monthly value-weighted returns from July year t to June year t+1 are then calculated. 
Table 4: Fama-French factors 
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The pricing factors are constructed as follows. 
SMB = average(S/L, S/M, S/H) – average(B/L, B/M, B/H).  
HML = average(S/H, B/H) – average(S/L, B/L) 
 
Table 5: Correlations 
 
Ødegaard (2015a) has constructed similar factors for the Oslo Stock Exchange. However, 
these factors are not available after June 201210. Johnsen (2011) argues that the Fama-French 
factors for the Norwegian market is unstable due to the small size of the Oslo Stock Exchange 
and the concentration on a few sectors. He finds that different methodologies of constructing 
the same factor could give negatively correlated results.  From the table above, we can see that 
the correlations between our Fama-French factors and those made by Ødegaard are 0.5596 
and 0.5791 for the HML and SMB factors respectively. As we use the same methodology as 
Ødegaard and only the screening criteria differ to some extent, it seems like the Fama-French 
factors are not very stable in Norway. This may affect the robustness of the estimated Fama-
French alphas.  
3.5 Multiples 
As argued in section 2.6, a key issue for a sound relative valuation is to find peers with similar 
key value drivers (e.g. tax rate, return on capital, cost of capital and long-term growth). We 
assume that domestic companies in the same industry have similar tax rates and cost of capital. 
Thus, we wanted to base our relative valuation on companies in the same industry. However, 
we did not manage to find a narrow industry-classification on Bloomberg. Therefore, we based 
the relative valuation on all the companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We believe that this 
                                                 
10 Ødegaard has now updated his Fama-French factors, making values for 2012, 2013 and 2014 available. 
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approach reduces the quality of our analysis. However, the approach is in line with Fama & 
French (1992a, 1993, 1996, 1998) and Gray & Vogel (2012). 
We also argued that you should base the relative valuation on cyclically adjusted accounting 
variables. Cyclically adjusted accounting variables are often calculated as a five or ten-year 
average. Thus, you will lose observations for all companies with less than five or ten years of 
data using this approach. Due to an already small sample size, we chose to use unadjusted 
accounting variables. We believe that this is another point that reduces the quality of our 
analysis. However, using unadjusted accounting variables is also in line with Fama & French 
(1992a, 1993, 1996, 1998) and Gray & Vogel (2012). 
As Fama & French (1992a) and most articles on the topic (see also (Gray & Vogel, 2012)), 
we match accounting data for year t-1 used in the multiples with the monthly returns from July 
year t to June year t+1. “The 6-month (minimum) gap between fiscal’s yearend and the return 
tests is conservative. Firms are indeed required to file their 10-K reports with the SEC within 
90 days of their fiscal year ends, but on average 19.8% do not comply. In addition more than 
40% of the December fiscal year ends firms that do comply with the 90 day rule file on March 
31, and their reports are not made public until April.” (Fama & French, 1992a). In Norway, 
firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange must publish their annual report within 4 months after 
the fiscal year end cf. Verdipapirhandelloven § 5-5 first paragraph, second and third sentence.  
Unlike Fama & French (1992a, 1993, 1996, 1998), we use the market values at the end of June 
year t in the multiples instead of the market values at the end of December year t-1. We believe 
that updated market values from June year t will be better predictors of returns from July year 
t to June year t+1 than outdated market values from December year t-1. For example, if the 
share price of a company with a low P/B at the end of December year t-1 increases with 100% 
from December year t-1 to June year t, we believe that it is less likely that the company is 
undervalued in June year t. The use of updated market values is in line with Gray & Vogel 
(2012) and earlier master theses on the subject in Norway (cf. (Engeberg & Enge, 2009)). 
Regarding the accounting variables for year t-1, we do not assume that they are available 
before the end of June year t. Ødegaard (2015a) does the same when he creates his Fama-
French factors for the Norwegian stock market. Earlier theses done by students in Norway 
differ in their assumptions, but they all assume that the accounting variables for year t-1 are 
published sometime between the start of April year t to the start of July year t. 
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For the multiples used in the Fama-MacBeth analysis, we also match accounting variables for 
year t-1 with the returns from July year t to June year t+1, but we update the market values 
each month. As mentioned above, we believe that updated market values will be better 
predictors of future returns than market values that are outdated. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1
 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝐵𝑒𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1
 
 
 47 
4. Method 
4.1 Overview 
We use two approaches in order to answer our research question. The first was introduced by 
Fama-MacBeth in 1973, while the second is a portfolio formation approach. As explained 
below, both the portfolio and Fama-MacBeth approach has some weaknesses. However, by 
using both we believe that our results become more robust.  
We use the Fama-MacBeth method because it works well for answering our basic research 
question. That is, whether there exist a relationship between multiples and future abnormal 
returns. Contrary to the portfolio approach, we can change the multiples each month (at least 
the market values). We believe that this will make a possible relationship between the 
multiples and future abnormal returns clearer. Stocks performing exceptionally well (bad) will 
go from being a low (high) multiple stock to a high (low) multiple stock. Using the portfolio 
approach, stocks are considered as a low (high) multiple stocks until rebalancing 12 months 
later, no matter how they perform. Another advantage with the Fama-MacBeth approach is 
that it utilizes information about the relationship between pricing multiples and abnormal 
returns for individual stocks. Using the portfolio approach, you will only register if the 
portfolio composed of stocks with low multiples yields higher/lower abnormal returns than 
the other portfolios. You will not register if stocks with lower multiples yield higher/lower 
abnormal returns than stocks with higher multiples within the low multiple portfolio.  
However, the Fama-Macbeth approach has its weaknesses as stated by Novy-Marx:” …..These 
regressions, because they weight each observation equally, put tremendous weight on the 
nano- and micro-cap stocks, which make up roughly two-thirds of the market by name but less 
than 6% of the market by capitalization. The Fama-MacBeth regressions are also sensitive to 
outliers, and impose a potentially misspecified parametric relation between the variables, 
making the economic significance of the results difficult to judge” (Marx, 2010). 
The main advantage of the portfolio approach is that it is replicable in the real world. For 
Sparebanken Vest and other practitioners, it is more interesting to know whether a possible 
relationship can be exploited than if it exists. Hence, our focus will be on the portfolio 
approach. As Basu (1977), Fama & French (1993) and Gray & Vogel (2012), we sort stocks 
into portfolios and examine whether value stocks (low multiples) give positive abnormal 
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returns and/or outperform growth stocks (high multiples). The portfolio approach using value-
weighted returns solves the weighting issue as it puts a higher weight on big stocks. Contrary 
to the Fama-MacBeth approach, the portfolio approach will be able to distinguish multiples 
ability to predict positive and negative abnormal returns. Some multiples may only be good at 
identifying undervalued stocks.  
4.2 Fama-MacBeth 
Fama-MacBeth description 
The Fama-MacBeth method combines a cross section regression with a time series regression. 
The approach is used to investigate whether certain factors (e.g. systematic risk) are prized on 
the stock market. In other words, the approach investigates if certain factors can explain the 
cross section of returns. First, we run the following regression: 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽2log (𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖. 
Each month the excess return for firm i is regressed against the CAPM beta11 of the firm and 
the value of a multiple. Then, the coefficients are added across time and the standard errors 
are calculated. 
As Novy-Marx (2010) and Fama & French (1992a), we do the analysis on individual securities 
rather than portfolios as first done by Fama-MacBeth (1973). We take the log of all the 
multiples. Then, a one percent increase in the value of the multiple is estimated to increase the 
excess return with approximately 
𝛽
100
 %. Earlier research shows that use of the logarithmic 
transformation reduces the skewedness and kurtosis of the data sample. Hence, the distribution 
becomes more symmetric and improves inference (Wilcoxon, 1999). All multiples and betas 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, meaning that the extreme multiple values are 
replaced with those from the 1st and 99th percentiles. We do this to avoid putting too much 
weight on outliers.  
                                                 
11 We retrieved the CAPM beta from Bloomberg 
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Fama-MacBeth analysis 
We will now go through what results we expect in the Fama-MacBeth analysis. That is, what 
kind of sign of we believe that the coefficients will have. Our hypothesis are summarized in 
the table below.  
Table 6: Hypotheses Fama-MacBeth 
 
In the theory section, we showed that the excess return for a company should be the product 
of the company’s beta and the excess market return. As the excess market return on average 
is positive (Døskeland, 2014), we expect the relationship between the company’s beta and the 
company’s excess return to be positive. Thus, based on the theory we believe that the CAPM 
beta coefficient should be positive. 
Holding the beta constant, we expect the excess return to increase when the multiple decreases. 
If stocks with low multiples are undervalued, they should yield higher returns than stocks with 
high multiples in both increasing and decreasing markets. Thus, we believe that the multiple 
coefficients should be negative. 
4.3 Portfolios 
Portfolio description  
At the end of June each year, stocks are sorted into tertiles (three equally large groups) based 
on the value of a multiple. We rank and sort stocks based on the value of EV/EBITDA, 
EV/EBIT, EV/FCFF, P/E, P/FCFE and P/B. This approach yields six different sets of 
portfolios. For P/E for instance, the high multiple portfolio contains stocks with a high P/E 
value, the medium multiple portfolio contains stocks with a medium P/E value, and the low 
multiple portfolio contains stocks with a low P/E value. Each June, the portfolios are 
rebalanced and the sample of stocks included in each portfolio is changed. 
Acrononym Description Hypothesis - coefficient
Beta log of CAPM Beta +
ln(EV/EBITDA) log of enterprise value-to-EBITDA -
ln(EV/EBIT) log of enterprise value-to-EBIT -
ln(EV/FCFF) log of enterprise value-to-FCFF -
ln(P/E) log of price-to-earnings -
ln(P/FCFE) log of market cap-to-FCFE -
ln(P/B) log of price-to-book -
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After the portfolio formation, the returns for the following 12 months (July year t to June year 
t+1) are calculated. Both equally weighted and value-weighted returns are computed. We use 
a buy and hold strategy, meaning that the portfolios are not rebalanced during the 12-month 
period. Further, we assume that all dividends are reinvested into the stocks. Stocks that are 
delisted due to a merger, bankruptcy or any other reason during the 12-month period get zero 
return after delisting.  
Our focus will be on the value-weighted portfolios12. Big investors like Sparebanken Vest 
cannot invest the same amount in every stock on the Oslo Stock Exchange. If a big investor 
were to invest a large amount in a company with a very small market capitalization, he would 
have pushed the demand for the stock far above the supply. This would push the average 
buying price far above its current price. However, if the big investor were to invest a large 
amount in a company with a very large market capitalization, he would not have a large effect 
on the demand. Then, he would not have a large effect on the average buying price. For small 
investors, it may be more realistic to invest equally in all stocks, as they do not have a large 
impact on the demand of the stock. Therefore, the equally weighted portfolios13 will also be 
considered when we make our conclusion. Fama & French (1992a, 1993, 1996, 1998) and 
Novy-Marx (2010) use value-weighted returns.  
We chose to sort the portfolios into tertiles14, because we want the portfolios to be well 
diversified. According to Ødegaard (2015c), portfolios are well diversified when the number 
of stocks in each portfolio is higher than 20. However, even five stocks in each portfolio 
removes much of the idiosyncratic risk. In Table 3, you will find an overview of the number 
of stocks in each portfolio each year. The lowest number of stocks in a portfolio is five, while 
the highest number of stocks in a portfolio is 59.  An alternative could be to sort the stocks 
into quartiles15 or quintiles16. The problem would be fewer stocks in each portfolio and more 
idiosyncratic risk, creating problems with inference.  
                                                 
12 Value weighted portfolio = weight each stock according to its market capitalization at the date of portfolio formation.  
13 Equally weighted portfolio = all stocks have the same weight at the date of portfolio formation.  
14 Tertiles = three groups 
15 Quartiles = four groups 
16 Quintiles = five groups 
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In addition to the three portfolios created for each multiple, we create a fourth portfolio for 
each multiple which we call long-short. In the fourth portfolio, we buy (long) the low multiple 
portfolio and sell (short) the high multiple portfolio. This portfolio will show whether value 
stocks outperform growth stocks.  
Portfolio analysis  
We analyse the performance of the portfolios by examining the CAPM and Fama-French 
abnormal returns. The CAPM abnormal returns are estimated running the following 
regression: 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 
The excess return for each portfolio in month t is regressed against the market premium (the 
market return (𝑟𝑚,𝑡) less the risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓,𝑡)).  𝛽1 gives the portfolio’s exposure to the 
market. If the beta is equal to one, the portfolio has the same systematic risk as the market. 𝛼 
gives the average monthly CAPM abnormal return and is often called Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 
1967). Since the average return is the best predictor of future return, it is the expected CAPM 
abnormal return. If the alpha is statistically greater than zero, the portfolio yielded a higher 
risk adjusted return than the market.    
The Fama-French abnormal returns are estimated running the following regression: 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
The excess return for each portfolio in month t is regressed against the market premium (the 
market return less the risk-free rate), the HML17 factor and the SMB18 factor. 𝛽1 is still the 
portfolio’s exposure to the market, 𝛽2 is the portfolio’s exposure to the HML factor and 𝛽3 is 
the portfolio’s exposure to the SMB factor. All else equal, a lower P/B ratio (load positive on 
HML) or a smaller firm size (load positive on SMB) increases the risk of the firm and hence 
the required return according to the Fama-French model. If the HML and SMB factors are 
positive, portfolios consisting of small stocks with low P/B ratios need much higher returns 
                                                 
17 HML = the excess returns of high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks 
18 SMB = the excess returns of small firms minus big firms 
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than portfolios consisting of big stocks with high P/B ratios in order to yield positive abnormal 
returns (𝛼). 
As Fama & French points out, portfolio evaluation is easy if you believe in their three-factor 
model. “If our results are taken at face value, evaluating performance of a managed portfolio 
is straightforward. The intercept (𝛼) in the time-series regression of the managed portfolio’s 
excess return on our five explanatory returns (three if the portfolio consist of only stocks) is 
the average abnormal return needed to judge whether a manager can beat the market, that is, 
whether he can use special information to generate average returns greater than those on 
passive combinations of the mimicking returns for the five risk factors (market, SMB and HML 
+ Def and Term for bonds).” (Fama & French, 1993). 
Table 7: Sign and size of alpha for low multiple and long-short portfolios 
 
The table above shows our expectations of the alphas (abnormal returns) for the low and long-
short portfolios. As we mentioned in section 2.10, we expect the EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and 
EV/FCFF multiples to be the best predictors of abnormal returns, and hence produce the 
highest alphas. We expect the P/E, P/FCFE and P/B multiples to yield somewhat weaker 
predictions of abnormal returns. The signs are positive, because we expect value stocks to 
outperform growth stocks and the market. 
By using the Fama-French factors to correct for risk, we are implicitly assuming that low P/B 
firms are riskier than high P/B firms (as we control for the HML factor). Therefore, we will 
most likely not get significant Fama-French alphas for the low P/B portfolio. We do not expect 
the low P/E portfolio to produce significant Fama-French alphas either, because Fama & 
French (1992a) show that the returns of low P/B stocks and low P/E stocks are highly 
correlated. 
  
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
CAPM alpha + + + + + +
Fama-French alpha + + + ~ + ~
 Multiples and size/sign of alpha
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As mentioned earlier, Fama & French (2011) believe that it does not matter which multiple 
you use to represent the risk associated with value stocks. Hence, they claim that all CAPM 
abnormal returns associated with value stocks should disappear if you correct for risk using 
the Fama-French model. On the other hand, Gray & Vogel (2012) show that multiples’ ability 
to predict returns vary quite much between the different multiples. They get significant Fama-
French alphas for several multiples. We believe it is valuable to correct for risk by using Fama-
French model. It will show if the other multiples can give abnormal returns beyond the well-
documented value premium of low P/B stocks.  
We would like to point out that a positive CAPM or Fama-French alpha is not the equivalent 
of a “true” positive abnormal return. The positive alphas may be a result of exposure to other 
risk factors (not controlled for by the CAPM or Fama-French model). However, by using both 
the CAPM and the Fama-French model, we believe that our results are more robust against a 
possible misspecification. 
4.4 How we make our conclusion 
We evaluate the following requirements when we make our conclusion: 
1. Statistically significant negative coefficient on the multiple using the Fama-MacBeth 
approach. 
2. The long-short portfolio yields statistically significant positive CAPM alpha. 
3. The low multiple portfolio yields statistically significant positive CAPM alpha. 
4. The long-short portfolio yields statistically significant positive Fama-French alpha. 
5. The low multiple portfolio yields statistically significant positive Fama-French alpha. 
We consider multiples satisfying requirement 1 through 3 to predict CAPM abnormal returns. 
We consider multiples satisfying requirement 4 and 5 to predict Fama-French abnormal 
returns. An opposite relationship of the ones described in requirement 1 through 5 (reversed 
signs) would be surprising and must be evaluated with caution, as we hardly find any 
theoretical or empirical support for such a relationship. 
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4.5 Regression assumptions  
In this thesis, we conduct several regressions analysis. We will now go through the necessary 
assumptions for large sample time series regressions.  
1. The model is linear in parameters (Wooldridge, 2013). Both the CAPM and the Fama-
French regressions are linear in parameters. In addition, the independent and dependent 
variables should be stationary and weakly dependent (Wooldridge, 2013). Monthly 
returns fluctuate a lot from month to month. This indicates that monthly returns are 
weakly dependent and stationary. As we can see from the table below, the correlation 
between the return in month t and month t-1 is almost zero.  
Table 8: Weakly dependent? 
 
In addition, if we run a Dickey Fuller test on the return of OSEBX, we find that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the return of OSEBX exhibits unit root at all reasonable 
significance levels (see Table 24). As expected, neither the return of OSEBX nor the 
return of the individual stocks show any sign of unit root. Assumption 1 seems to be 
satisfied. 
2. There is no perfect collinearity among the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2013). 
The HML and SMB factor are created such that they are not very correlated with each 
other or the market, see Table 5. This assumption seems to be satisfied.  
3. E(ut|xt1,…, xtk ) = E(ut ) = 0, where t is time t, u is the residual and xk is the independent 
variable k. This assumption is called contemporaneous exogeneity assumption 
(Wooldridge, 2013). The independent variables should not be correlated with the 
residuals. If neither the CAPM nor the Fama-French model is the correct asset-pricing 
model, there could exist other risk factors (present in the residuals) that affect both the 
independent variables (market, HML and SMB) and the returns of the portfolios, 
resulting in biased estimates of the betas and violation of assumption 3. This is 
definitely a source of error in our thesis. By using both the CAPM and the Fama-French 
model, we believe that our results are more robust against a possible misspecification. 
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4. For all t, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡|𝑋) = 𝜎
2, where 𝜎2 is the variance. This assumption is called the 
homoscedasticity assumption (Wooldridge, 2013). The variance cannot fluctuate over 
time or conditional on variables. In financial market, the variance may fluctuate over 
time. For instance under the financial crisis, the variance were much higher than 
normal. Therefore, we use robust standard errors in all our regressions and assume 
contemporaneous homoscedasticity: 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡|𝑥𝑡) = 𝜎
2. 
5. There should be no autocorrelation, 𝐸(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑠|𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑠) = 0, for period s and t 
(Wooldridge, 2013). The residuals should not be correlated across time. We find no 
evidence of autocorrelation in the portfolio regressions (see Table 25 in the appendix). 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation at any reasonable 
significance level.  
Under the assumptions 1 through 5, the OLS estimators are approximately normally 
distributed as the number of observations goes to infinity. In addition to this, the t-statistics 
are asymptotic standard normal and the F statistics are valid in large samples. The usual OLS 
confidence intervals are also valid (Wooldridge, 2013). As discussed above, we find no clear 
evidence that the regression assumptions are violated.   
For the Fama-MacBeth analysis, we use Newey-West standard errors as Novy-Marx (2010), 
to correct for autocorrelation. We use 12 lags to correct for autocorrelation. We also tested the 
Fama-MacBeth regressions with two lags and with no correction for autocorrelation. This did 
not change our results very much (see Table 26 for the Fama-MacBeth analysis with no 
correction for autocorrelation).  
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5. Results 
5.1 Fama-MacBeth 
In the table below, we present the regression output from the Fama-MacBeth approach. The 
excess returns for each stock is regressed against the CAPM beta and the value of a pricing 
multiple, before the coefficients are averaged across time. Thus, if the coefficient of the pricing 
multiple is significant, we conclude that the pricing multiple predicts CAPM abnormal returns. 
Table 9: Fama-MacBeth 2000-2015 
  
  
2000-2015 Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf
0.0961 -0.122 -0.302 -0.334 -0.978* -0.440
(0.520) (0.578) (0.538) (0.527) (0.588) (0.405)
-0.433**
(0.205)
-0.561***
(0.160)
-0.281*
(0.166)
0.120
(0.144)
0.0265
(0.125)
0.229
(0.245)
1.312 2.084*** 1.842** 0.596 1.401* 0.816
(0.852) (0.639) (0.801) (0.683) (0.821) (0.716)
Observations 16042 13942 5941 13970 8982 22944
R-squared 0.051 0.054 0.087 0.053 0.073 0.049
Constant
Log (P/FCFE)
Log (P/B)
Beta
Log(EV/EVEBITDA)
Log(EV/EVEBIT)
Log(EVFCFF)
Log (P/E)
The cross section of excess monthly returns measured in percentage terms is regressed against 
the beta of the stock and the multiple, before the coefficients are averaged. Only stocks that have 
a positive multiple and have been traded for two years are included in the sample. The return is 
measured from July year t to June year t+1, the accounting variable is from year t-1. The market 
cap and the enterprise value used in the multiples are from start of the month. * = 10 % 
significance level, ** = 5 % significance level, *** = 1% significance level. Standard errors are 
in the parentheses.  
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According to the CAPM theory, the betas should explain most of the variation in the cross 
section of equity returns. However, only one of the coefficients of the CAPM betas are 
significant at any reasonable significance level. The coefficients also have the wrong sign19. 
Thus, like the majority of empirical studies, we do not find any support for the CAPM theory 
(cf. (Fama & French, 1992a)). 
We expected stocks with low multiples to outperform stocks with high multiples. Increased 
value of the multiple should therefore result in decreased returns. Thus, we expected the 
coefficient on the multiples to be negative. From the regression output above, we notice that 
the coefficient on EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/FCFF is negative and significantly different 
from zero. An increase of 100% in the EV/EBIT multiple is estimated to decrease the average 
excess return by approximately 0.561% per month, holding the beta risk constant. This is 
statistically significant even at a significance level of 1%. With an average EV/EBIT multiple 
of 21.3 and a standard deviation of 17.9, a difference of 100% in the EV/EBIT multiple 
between two companies is not unusual. The coefficient of EV/EBITDA is significant at the 
5% significance level, while the coefficient of EV/FCFF is significant at the 10% level.  
Neither P/E, P/FCFE nor P/B have significant coefficients. The coefficients also have the 
wrong sign. These results are very surprising. Almost all studies find a negative relationship 
between the excess return of a stock and the value of P/E and P/B (cf. Fama-French (1992a). 
We will investigate these finding further under the portfolio approach.  
5.2 Portfolios  
In this section, we present our main findings using the portfolio approach. In section 5.3, we 
discuss our findings. Ex ante, we believed that the long-short portfolios and the low multiple 
portfolios would yield statistically significant positive abnormal returns. We will focus on the 
alphas from the regressions since they show whether you achieve abnormal returns or not. A 
positive alpha represents positive abnormal return, while a negative alpha represents negative 
abnormal return. First, we present the results for the whole period, before we examine the sub-
periods. As mentioned earlier, the value-weighted portfolios will be our main focus. A 
                                                 
19 In the theory section, we showed that the excess return of a stock should be positively related to the CAPM beta when the 
excess market return is positive (as it was in the period 2000-2015). 
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discussion of the gross returns and r-squared can be found in the appendix (section 11.8 and 
11.9). All the tables in this section show the CAPM and Fama-French alphas for the equally 
weighted and value-weighted portfolios. 
Table 10: Alphas 2000-2015 
 
From the table above, we notice that both asset-pricing models give similar results. Calculating 
equally or value-weighted returns do not make much difference either. The portfolio consisting 
of low EV/FCFF stocks is the only low multiple portfolio that has yielded a significant positive 
alpha over the whole period. For the value-weighted portfolios, buying low EV/FCFF firms 
has yielded a significant positive CAPM alpha of 0.76% per month. The monthly abnormal 
return of 0.76% translates into an impressive annual abnormal return of 9.12%, significant at 
the 5% level. Correcting for risk using the Fama-French model reduces the alpha to 0.685% 
per month, but it is still significant at the 5% level. As expected, we find no evidence indicating 
that higher multiples increase the abnormal returns. 
Method Value-weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.158 0.174 0.760** 0.247 0.307 -0.136
Medium 0.200 0.146 0.250 -0.116 0.109 0.133
High -0.461* -0.385 0.162 -0.113 0.0469 -0.125
Long-short 0.619 0.559 0.598 0.360 0.260 -0.0110
Method Value-weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.130 0.143 0.685** 0.169 0.255 -0.319
Medium 0.180 0.161 0.269 -0.0887 0.176 0.119
High -0.448* -0.370 0.194 -0.0926 0.0403 -0.0363
Long-short 0.577 0.513 0.491 0.262 0.215 -0.283
Method Equally weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.154 0.262 0.701*** 0.0618 0.0993 -0.0363
Medium -0.0337 -0.0160 0.340 -0.0490 0.251 0.0266
High -0.0690 -0.0337 -0.0385 0.222 -0.102 -0.138
Long-short 0.223 0.295 0.740** -0.160 0.201 0.102
Method Equally weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.0714 0.218 0.695*** -0.0280 0.0642 -0.234
Medium -0.0589 -0.0567 0.334 -0.0470 0.274 0.0243
High -0.0953 -0.0549 -0.0333 0.225 -0.144 -0.0239
Long-short 0.167 0.273 0.728** -0.253 0.208 -0.210
2000-2015
CAPM
Fama-French
CAPM
Fama-French
The regressions 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 are run for each portfolio and the alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage 
terms. There are 172 monthly observation between 2000 and 2015. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance 
level, ** = 5 % significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicates that the portfolio 
yields positive significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is significant 
negative. 
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We notice that the long-short strategy using EV/FCFF only yields significant positive alphas 
for the equally weighted portfolios. This indicates that EV/FCFF is a better selection tool for 
small firms than big firms, which also makes sense intuitively. Small firms are less analysed 
and therefore more likely to be mispriced. As we control for the risk associated with small 
firms using the Fama-French factors, the positive Fama-French alpha cannot be explained by 
the higher risk associated with small firms. 
The other multiples do not seem to predict CAPM or Fama-French alphas. These results are 
very surprising and contradicts all prior research we have read. Almost all studies find that the 
low P/E and low P/B portfolios yield positive CAPM alphas (cf. (Fama & French, 1992a), 
(S.Basu, 1977)). EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT have also shown the ability to predict Fama-
French alphas (cf. (Gray & Vogel, 2012), (Loughran & Wellman, 2011). In search of an 
explanation of these surprising results, we divided the whole period (2000-2015) into two sub-
periods, one period before the start of the financial crisis in 2008 and one period after. 
Table 11: Alphas 2000-2008 
 
Method Value-weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.622** 0.657* 1.096** 0.636* 0.843* 0.0467
Medium -0.0579 0.0163 0.320 0.0482 0.0330 0.473*
High -0.511 -0.580 0.127 -0.602 -0.262 -0.237
Long-short 1.133* 1.237* 0.969 1.238 1.104 0.283
Method Value-weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.375 0.420 0.826* 0.401 0.603 -0.481
Medium -0.0682 -0.0421 0.248 0.0652 0.154 0.370
High -0.356 -0.317 -0.0281 -0.603 0.0404 0.149
Long-short 0.731 0.736 0.854 1.004 0.563 -0.630
Method Equally weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.759** 0.612** 0.742** 0.649** 0.566 0.620
Medium 0.00775 -0.0386 0.439 0.0434 0.277 0.140
High -0.300 -0.302 -0.0676 -0.177 0.0226 -0.545
Long-short 1.059** 0.914** 0.809** 0.826** 0.544 1.165***
Method Equally weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.401 0.431* 0.678* 0.301 0.417 -0.0640
Medium -0.0760 -0.312 0.315 0.0521 0.276 0.121
High -0.272 -0.185 -0.00174 -0.321 -0.125 -0.214
Long-short 0.673 0.616 0.680 0.622* 0.543 0.150
2000-2008
CAPM
Fama-French
CAPM
Fama-French
The regressions 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 are run for each portfolio and the alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage 
terms. There are 92 monthly observation between 2000 and 2008. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance 
level, ** = 5 % significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicates that the portfolio 
yields positive significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is 
significant negative. 
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In the period before the start of the financial crisis (2000-2008), our results are almost exactly 
as expected and more in line with prior studies. In this period, a lower multiple was associated 
with higher abnormal returns. Among the low multiple portfolios, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, 
EV/FCFF and P/E seem to predict significant positive CAPM alphas. Low P/FCFE and low 
P/B perform weaker than expected. Low P/FCFE only yields a positive CAPM alpha for the 
value-weighted portfolio, while low P/B does not yield any significant CAPM alphas. 
Using the long-short strategy, EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT is the best performing portfolios, 
yielding significant positive CAPM alphas for both the equally and value-weighted portfolios. 
The long-short strategy using EV/FCFF, P/E and P/B only yields positive CAPM alphas for 
the equally weighted portfolios, while the long-short P/FCFE portfolio does not yield any 
significant CAPM alphas. 
We notice that most of the CAPM abnormal returns disappear when correcting for risk using 
the Fama-French three-factor model. Only the low EV/FCFF portfolio yields significant 
positive Fama-French alphas for both the equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios. In 
the theory section, we explained that Fama & French (1992a) believe that value stocks are 
riskier than other stocks. In Table 27 in the appendix, we show that all of the low multiple 
portfolios include an overweight of low P/B stocks as they load positive on the HML factor 
between 2000 and 2008. Hence, according to the Fama-French model, stocks included in the 
low multiple portfolios are riskier than other stocks. Therefore, they should yield higher 
returns to compensate investors for the increased risk. Adjusting for risk however, there should 
be no difference. This holds for all the low multiple portfolios investigated in our thesis, except 
from the low EV/FCFF portfolio. 
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Table 12: Alphas 2008-2015 
 
In the period after the start of the financial crisis (2008-2015), none of the multiples seems to 
predict CAPM and/or Fama-French abnormal returns. Only the EV/FCFF multiple comes 
close, yielding significant positive CAPM and Fama-French alphas for the equally weighted 
low multiple portfolio. In general, the high multiple portfolios performed a bit better than the 
low multiple portfolios in this period. Thus, the surprising results for the whole period seem 
to stem from the period after the start of the financial crisis. 
We notice that most of the low multiple portfolios have negative risk adjusted returns, even 
after controlling for the exposure to the Fama-French factors. Hence, the poor performance of 
the low multiple portfolios cannot be explained solely by the HML and SMB factors. 
Method Value-weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low -0.381 -0.406 0.464 -0.156 -0.324 -0.357
Medium 0.487* 0.293 0.164 -0.330 0.160 -0.244
High -0.425 -0.144 0.204 0.422 0.455 -0.0239
Long-short 0.0438 -0.263 0.260 -0.578 -0.779 -0.333
Method Value-weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low -0.449* -0.467* 0.482 -0.147 -0.248 -0.0427
Medium 0.567** 0.246 0.0943 -0.362 0.0663 -0.279
High -0.351 -0.0520 0.0316 0.510 0.519 -0.103
Long-short -0.0982 -0.415 0.450 -0.657 -0.767 0.0605
Method Equally weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low -0.565 -0.149 0.626* -0.600* -0.468 -0.825
Medium -0.106 -0.0304 0.209 -0.193 0.188 -0.131
High 0.177 0.274 -0.0184 0.674* -0.261 0.271
Long-short -0.742 -0.422 0.645 -1.274*** -0.207 -1.096*
Method Equally weighted EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low -0.359 -0.00574 0.735** -0.418 -0.277 -0.332
Medium 0.0597 0.0909 0.236 -0.0808 0.270 0.0335
High 0.441 0.577 0.0988 0.806*** -0.150 0.312
Long-short -0.800 -0.583 0.637 -1.224*** -0.126 -0.644
CAPM
Fama-French
CAPM
Fama-French
2008-2015
The regressions 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 are run for each portfolio and the alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage 
terms. There are 80 monthly observation between 2008 and 2015. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance 
level, ** = 5 % significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicates that the portfolio 
yields positive significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is 
significant negative. 
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5.3 Theory vs. results 
Answer to research question 
Our research question is “Do pricing multiples predict abnormal returns for stocks on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange?” In order to answer our research question, we evaluate the following 
requirements: 
1. Statistically significant negative coefficient on the multiple using the Fama-MacBeth 
approach. 
2. The long-short portfolio yields statistically significant positive CAPM alpha. 
3. The low multiple portfolio yields statistically significant positive CAPM alpha. 
4. The long-short portfolio yields statistically significant positive Fama-French alpha. 
5. The low multiple portfolio yields statistically significant positive Fama-French alpha. 
We consider multiples satisfying requirement 1 through 3 to predict CAPM abnormal returns. 
We consider multiples satisfying requirement 4 and 5 to predict Fama-French abnormal 
returns. The table below summarizes our results. Below we only show whether value stocks 
have outperformed the market and growth stocks and not the other way around. This is in line 
with our hypothesis. Moreover, we did not find evidence indicating that growth stocks 
outperformed value stocks during the entire period. Thus, it was no point of showing a table 
for such a relationship. 
Table 13: Theory vs. Results 2000-2015 
 
Approach Portfolio EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Theoretical conclusion      
Negative Fama-MacBeth coefficient?      
Value-weighted      
Equal-weighted      
Value-weighted      
Equal-weighted      
Value-weighted      
Equal-weighted      
Value-weighted      
Equal-weighted      
Positive CAPM alpha for the 
long-short portfolio?
Positive CAPM alpha for the low 
multiple portfolio?
Positive Fama-French alpha for 
the long-short portfolio?
Positive Fama-French alpha for 
the low multiple portfolio?
Do pricing multiples predict future abnormal returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange? 
 63 
In the theory part, we concluded that all multiples should be able to predict abnormal returns, 
at least when using the CAPM. We believed that EV/EBIT would be the best selection tool, 
followed by EV/EBITDA and EV/FCFF.  
Based on the Fama-MacBeth approach, our expectations were in line with the realized results. 
The coefficients on the EV/EBIT, EV/EBITDA and EV/FCFF multiples were negative and 
statistically significant. However, none of the other multiples had statistically significant 
coefficients. 
Using the portfolio approach, our expectations were far from the realized results. Only the 
EV/FCFF multiple seems to predict CAPM and/or Fama-French abnormal returns. A lower 
EV/FCFF multiple was associated with higher abnormal returns. During the whole period, 
EV/FCFF satisfies seven out of our nine criteria. We especially want to highlight the equally 
weighted EV/FCFF portfolio. The equally weighted EV/FCFF portfolio satisfies four out of 
the four portfolio criteria. As the Fama-MacBeth approach also is based on equally weighted 
returns, the equally weighted EV/FCFF multiple satisfies five out of the five criteria. 
According to the CAPM and Fama-French model, low EV/FCFF firms are undervalued while 
high EV/FCFF firms are relatively overvalued. None of the other multiples seems to predict 
CAPM and/or Fama-French abnormal returns. We notice that our conclusion is the same 
whether we estimate the abnormal returns using the CAPM or the Fama-French model. 
EV/FCFF is the only multiple satisfying requirement 1 through 3 and/or requirement 4 and 5. 
The Fama-MacBeth approach on the individual stocks and the portfolio approach did not give 
similar results for EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT. One explanation is that the Fama-MacBeth 
approach is too sensitive to outliers and extreme observations for these multiples, as explained 
by Novy Marx (2013). A second explanation is that we update the multiples every month in 
the Fama-MacBeth approach, while we only update the multiples once every year in the 
portfolio approach. Another explanation is that sorting stocks into three portfolios was not 
enough to capture the difference between growth and value stocks. Nevertheless, in the 
robustness section we change the sorting to 20-60-20 portfolios20 without major differences in 
                                                 
20 We sort the stocks with the 20 percent lowest pricing multiples in one portfolio (low), the stocks with the 20 percent 
highest pricing multiples in another portfolio (high) and the remaining 60 percent of the stocks in a third portfolio (medium). 
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the results. As the Fama-MacBeth and portfolio approach yield different results, we do not 
find the relationship strong enough to conclude that EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA predict CAPM 
abnormal returns. 
Our results are quite astonishing. It is an established truth in finance that value stocks (e.g. low 
P/B) provide positive CAPM abnormal returns. Most of the academic community use an asset-
pricing model based on this notion. If this turns out to be a spurious relationship, it will have 
great implications for portfolio managers following a strategy of buying stocks with low 
multiples (value stocks). It will also have great implications for researchers and practitioners 
using the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate the cost of capital.  
Volatility of accounting variables 
In the theory section, we argued that you should use cyclically adjusted accounting variables 
in the denominator of the multiples. However, due to our small sample size, we decided to use 
unadjusted accounting variables. In the table below, we show the volatility of the unadjusted 
accounting variables: 
Table 14: Volatility of accounting21 variables 
 
The table above is constructed by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of the 
accounting variable for each company. Then, we calculated the average of this measure for all 
companies. As expected, the book value has the lowest volatility, followed by EBITDA and 
EBIT. Net income has a lower volatility than we first believed. Both FCFF and FCFE are very 
volatile, as expected. Interestingly, the best performing multiple (EV/FCFF) has the most 
volatile accounting variable. An explanation could be that FCFF co-varies across firms. Then 
depressed and inflated FCFF happen at the same time across companies, making deviation 
from cyclical adjusted FCFF values less problematic. Firms may tend to invest at the same 
time, resulting in a highly volatile FCFF that co-varies across firms. 
                                                 
21 FCFF and FCFE are not accounting variables per se, but can be derived from the financial report.  
EBITDA EBIT FCFF Net income FCFE Book value
Average(std/mean) 0.48 0.66 3.19 0.94 3.19 0.44
Rank 2 3 6 4 5 1
The table is constructed by dividing the standard deviation by the mean value of the accounting 
variable for each company. Then, we calculated the average of this measure for all companies 
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6. Analysis 
6.1 Overview 
In this chapter, we try to investigate potential explanations of the surprising results during the 
last period (2008-2015). It is worth noting that not all of the low multiple portfolios started to 
perform poorly from 2008 and onwards. However, by looking at the cumulative return for the 
different portfolios (not shown in the thesis), the trend is clear. On average, the shift seems to 
occur in the period 2008-2015. We will also try to explain why the low EV/FCFF portfolio 
outperformed the other low multiple portfolios. In the appendix (see 11.11), we show evidence 
indicating that the introduction of IFRS have not changed the relationship between multiples 
and future returns.  
6.2 Why did value firms fail?  
Cyclical returns 
One possible explanation of the surprising results is that value stocks have cyclical returns 
compared to growth stocks. Most of the time, they outperform growth stocks, but in some 
periods they underperform. Fama & French (1992a) argues that is the case. They claim that 
stocks with low multiples have higher risk and should therefore get a risk premium.  
Figure 6: Cyclical returns 
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Above we show the 60 months trailing moving average return for a long-short strategy using 
P/E and P/B in USA and Norway. The graph illustrates that the relative return of value stocks 
compared to growth stocks seems to move in cycles. For our sample period (2000-2015), value 
stocks seem to have outperformed growth stocks in the period before the financial crisis. After 
the crisis in 2008 however, value stocks have performed poorly. The return of value stocks 
compared to growth stocks seems to follow the same pattern in Norway and USA. Hence, it 
may be the case that we are just “unlucky” with our sample period. 
One question may arise. Why did we get negative alphas after controlling for the HML factor 
for all of the low multiple portfolios except from the low EV/FCFF portfolio? Should not the 
Fama-French factors take into account the bad performance of the value stocks compared to 
the growth stocks? A possible explanation may be that the return of value and growth stocks 
fluctuate differently for the different multiples, e.g. that the long-short EV/EBIT portfolio 
fluctuates differently than the long-short P/B portfolio. 
Even though we have found that value stocks have cyclical returns compared to growth stocks, 
it does not explain the sudden change in the last sub-period (2008-2015). In the next sub-
chapters, we try to outline possible explanations for this sudden change. 
Financial crisis  
Our last period (2008-2015) includes the financial crisis. If value stocks performed very poorly 
during the crisis, this would affect the results for the entire sub-period. However, the low 
EV/FCFF portfolio is the only low multiple portfolio that underperformed the market during 
the financial crisis with a return of -64% compared with the market return of -56%. Thus, the 
market crash in 2008 cannot explain the bad performance of the low multiple portfolios. These 
results are in line with Gray & Vogel (2012). They claim that value stocks outperform the 
market both in expansion and contraction periods “…we do find evidence that valuation-based 
strategies do outperform the market in both expanding and contracting economic 
environments” (Gray & Vogel, 2012).  
The risk-free rate 
One of the most striking characteristics of the period after the start of the financial crisis is the 
very low risk-free interest rates. According to the Bank of England, the current risk-free 
interest rate is the lowest in 5000 years (Ringholm, 2015). From the theory section, we 
remember that the CAPM estimate the cost of equity as: 
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𝑘 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ [𝐸(𝑟𝑀) − 𝑟𝑓] 
If we assume that the beta (𝛽𝑖) and market risk premium [𝐸(𝑟𝑀) − 𝑟𝑓] have stayed constant, 
the decrease in the risk-free interest rate (𝑟𝑓) should result in a lower cost of equity (𝑘). This 
may very well be the explanation for why value stocks have not outperformed growth stocks 
since the start of the financial crisis. Let us assume that the major difference between growth 
stocks and value stocks is that growth stocks have a higher growth rate22. Then, growth stocks 
will have a higher sensitivity to changes in the cost of equity. We will illustrate the impact of 
a lower cost of equity using the key value driver formula for equity: 
𝑃0 = ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
= ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑡−1
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
=
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸1
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝐸𝑃𝑆1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
Where 𝑃0 is the fair share price, 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡 is the free cash flow to equity year t, and 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 is the 
earnings per share year t. 𝑔 is the long-term growth rate, 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 is the return on new equity 
investments, and 𝑘 is the cost of equity. 
Consider two companies (Growth and Value) that are identical on all aspects except from one. 
Both companies have a beta of one, return on new equity investments (RONE) of 15% and 
earnings per share (EPS) of 10 dollars next year. The only difference is that Growth’s EPS 
will grow at a rate of 4% per year in perpetuity, while Value’s EPS will only grow at a rate of 
1% per year in perpetuity. Let us assume that the market risk premium is 5% and that the long-
term risk-free interest rate decreases from 5% to 3%23. With a beta of one, the companies’ cost 
of equity (k) will decrease from 10% to 8%. This will have the following implication for the 
fair price of the two companies: 
Table 15: Effect of risk-free rate 
 
                                                 
22 From the theory section, we know that higher growth rates translates into a higher fair multiple if the return on new equity 
investments is greater than the cost of equity. 
23 The yield on 10-year Norwegian government bonds decreased from 4.8% in May 2008 to 1.3% in January 2015 
Company EPS(t+1) Growth RONE Fair price (k = 10%) Fair price (k = 8%) Difference
Growth 10 4 % 15 % 122 183 50 %
Value 10 1 % 15 % 104 133 29 %
Difference 0 3 % 0 % 19 50 21 %
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We notice that Growth will outperform Value by 21 percentage points when the long-term 
risk-free interest rate decreases from 5% to 3%. We can explain this outperformance with a 
concept from bond pricing called duration. Santos (2014) gives the following definition of 
duration: “The duration of a cash flow stream provides the “weighted-average” arrival time 
of cash flows, where the weight of time t is determined by the relative contribution of the 
present value of the cash flows obtained at time t to the total present value of all the cash 
flows”. 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∑ 𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
=
∑
𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
A higher duration translates into a higher sensitivity to changes in the discount rate (cost of 
equity). Because a relatively large portion of the FCFE for Growth arrives later than the FCFE 
for Value, Growth will have a higher duration and a higher sensitivity to changes in the cost 
of equity. Thus, the decrease in the long-term risk-free interest rate may explain why value 
stocks have not outperformed growth stocks since the start of the financial crisis. If this is the 
true explanation, the poor performance of value stocks is a one-time event. 
As many different factors affect the CAPM beta (e.g. capital structure and GDP sensitivity), 
the interest rate risk is not entirely captured by the CAPM. For multiples that are highly 
correlated with P/B, the interest rate risk is controlled for using the HML factor. However, for 
multiples that are not highly correlated with P/B, the decrease in the risk-free interest rate may 
also explain the change in the Fama-French alphas. 
In the example above, we assumed that only the cost of equity would change when the risk-
free interest rate decreases. This may not be a realistic assumption. However, in the appendix 
(section 11.10) we argue that it is reasonable to assume that the long-term growth rate and 
return on new equity investments have stayed constant during this period. 
Based on the argumentation above, we believe that the decrease in the long-term risk-free 
interest rate offers the best explanation for why value stocks have performed poorly after the 
financial crisis. Holding all other variables constant growth stocks should outperform value 
stocks in this environment. This may have neutralized the “underlying” value premium and in 
some cases actually made growth stocks outperform value stocks. 
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Liquidity  
“It is an established truth in finance that value stocks (low pricing) and small stocks (low 
market capitalization) provide excess return. The last few years, however, both factors failed, 
both at home and abroad.” (Bergh, 2012). 
Finn Øystein Bergh (Chief Investment Officer at Pareto AS) claims that the bad performance 
of the value stocks is explained by lower liquidity. This has resulted in lower returns for value 
stocks over the last couple of years, but higher expected returns in the future as compensation 
for the decreased liquidity. We do not control for liquidity in either the CAPM or the Fama-
French model. Thus, lower liquidity can explain the negative alphas for the low multiple 
portfolios. To get an overview of the liquidity of the portfolios, we computed liquidity as the 
total turnover24 divided by the average market capitalization during a portfolio year (July year 
t to June year t+1). 
Figure 7: Liquidity for P/E value-weighted portfolios 
 
                                                 
24 Turnover is the number stocks traded during a month multiplied with the price. 
Liquidity is measured as: (sum turnover from July year to June year t+1)/(Average market cap from 
July year t to June year t+1) The liquidity for the portfolios is the value-weighted average of the 
liquidity of the firms.   
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We can see that the liquidity fell drastically for all portfolios between 2008 and 2015. When 
liquidity falls, the liquidity premium increases and returns tend to be low. If Bergh’s theory is 
correct, value stocks should have the greatest decline in liquidity. Bergh published his article 
in 2012. From the chart above, we notice that the liquidity dropped much for value stocks in 
the period 2008-201225. However, the difference in the decline between value stocks and 
growth stocks is only marginal. Thus, we believe that this is only part of the explanation.  
6.3 Why did the low EV/FCFF portfolio perform best?  
In this section, we try to investigate why the low EV/FCFF portfolio outperformed the other 
low multiple portfolios. In the table below, all value-weighted portfolios with annualized gross 
return higher than the market (OSEBX) are marked with green. 
Table 16: Gross return for the value-weighted portfolios 
 
 
Notice that all EV/FCFF portfolios yielded higher gross returns than the market in both sub-
periods. This illustrates that the companies with a valid EV/FCFF multiple are not a 
representative sample of the stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The biased sample may 
explain why the low EV/FCFF portfolio outperformed the other low multiple portfolios. 
However, we still consider EV/FCFF as a good selection tool to predict returns, as the gross 
return decreases when you go from the low EV/FCFF portfolio to the high EV/FCFF portfolio 
                                                 
25 The other multiples show the same pattern when it comes to liquidity. 
09.2000-01.2015 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 8.7 % 8.8 % 16.1 % 9.7 % 10.1 % 4.9 %
Medium 9.3 % 8.2 % 9.8 % 5.2 % 8.0 % 8.7 %
High 0.9 % 1.7 % 8.3 % 4.7 % 6.6 % 5.2 %
OSEBX 7.4 % 7.4 % 7.4 % 7.4 % 7.4 % 7.4 %
09.2000-05.2008 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 18.7 % 19.2 % 24.4 % 19.0 % 21.7 % 11.8 %
Medium 9.8 % 10.1 % 14.2 % 11.1 % 10.8 % 17.5 %
High 4.6 % 3.2 % 12.0 % 2.5 % 6.2 % 7.4 %
OSEBX 11.6 % 11.6 % 11.6 % 11.6 % 11.6 % 11.6 %
05.2008-01.2015 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low -1.7 % -2.0 % 7.2 % -0.1 % -1.9 % -2.5 %
Medium 8.8 % 6.1 % 4.9 % -1.2 % 4.8 % -0.6 %
High -3.3 % 0.0 % 4.2 % 7.3 % 7.1 % 2.7 %
OSEBX 2.8 % 2.8 % 2.8 % 2.8 % 2.8 % 2.8 %
The gross return is computed as the annualized geometric average return. All portfolios with 
annualized gross return higher than the market (OSEBX) are marked with green. 
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in both sub-periods. This is supported by the positive alphas on the long-short EV/FCFF 
portfolio using equally weighted returns in section 5.2. 
In the table below, we compare some of the key value drivers for the low multiple portfolios: 
Table 17 Characteristics for the low multiple portfolios 
 
We notice that the low EV/FCFF portfolio is exposed to relatively small companies and has a 
relatively high return on invested capital (ROIC). Moreover, the low EV/FCFF portfolio has 
the highest cost of capital (WACC) among the low multiple portfolios. The higher cost of 
capital should also result in a higher expected return, as compensation for the increased risk. 
However, we adjusted for differences in the cost of capital when we calculated the abnormal 
returns. Thus, differences in the cost of capital cannot explain the outperformance of the low 
EV/FCFF portfolio. The most striking characteristic of the low EV/FCFF portfolio is the very 
low net investment rate of -1%. We measure the net investment rate using the following 
formula: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) − 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
 
Where 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 is the earnings before interest and taxes, 𝑡 is the tax rate and 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 is the free 
cash flow to the firm. 
The low EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, P/E and P/FCFE portfolios have net investment rates 
ranging from 32% to 44%. The low P/B portfolio has a very low net investment rate of -15%. 
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Market cap 20,275 20,366 9,920 14,960 12,198 4,041
Enterprise value 24,595 23,944 11,698 21,124 18,343 7,813
Growth rate 19 % 19 % 16 % 18 % 22 % 23 %
ROIC 15 % 20 % 18 % 13 % 8 % 1 %
Tax rate 29 % 27 % 24 % 17 % 23 % 26 %
WACC 7.5 % 7.9 % 8.1 % 7.5 % 7.3 % 6.9 %
EBIT 5,212 5,330 1,770 3,648 3,846 751
FCFF 2,493 2,204 1,361 2,020 1,704 638
Net investment rate 32 % 44 % -1 % 33 % 43 % -15 %
Observations 450 411 170 400 232 580
Characteristics for the low multiple portfolios
The variables are obtained by taking a simple mean for each portfolio using yearly observations. All 
variables except market cap and enterprise value are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Please 
see the appendix (section 11.12) for a complete description of the abbreviations in this table. The 
“growth rate” is the 5-year average growth rate in revenues. Enterprise value market capitalization, 
EBIT and FCFF are measured in millions. 
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However, the average low P/B company actually has a negative net income (not shown in the 
table above). With a negative net income, the company does not have to pay any taxes. Thus, 
the formula above will most likely underestimate the net investment rates for the low P/B 
companies. If we use a tax rate of 0% instead of 26% for the low P/B portfolio in the formula 
above, we end up with a net investment rate of 15%.  
If we exclude the low P/B portfolio, the low EV/FCFF companies seem to invest significantly 
less than the other companies. As the low EV/FCFF portfolio has outperformed the other low 
multiple portfolios, investors seem to have penalized companies making large investments 
over the last couple of years. Investors should only penalize companies making large 
investments if they believe that the return on new invested capital is below the cost of capital. 
It may be the case that investors were pessimistic regarding return on new investments in the 
years after the financial crisis of 2008.  
One major flaw with our analysis above is that it requires FCFF and EBIT observations for all 
the firms. Many firms only have EBIT observations and not FCFF observations. This could 
make the estimated net investment rates biased. However, below we compare the net 
investment rates for all the EV/FCFF portfolios, which have both EBIT and FCFF 
observations. We can see the same pattern for the EV/FCFF portfolios. The low EV/FCFF 
portfolio, which outperforms both the medium and high EV/FCFF portfolios, has a much 
lower net investment rate. This result supports our hypothesis from above that investors seem 
to have penalized companies making large investments over the last couple of years. As the 
low EV/FCFF companies do not seem to make large investments, they outperform companies 
that do make large investments. 
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Table 18: Characteristics for the EV/FCFF portfolios 
 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have outlined several potential explanations for the surprising results during 
the period after the start of the financial crisis (2008-2015). During this period, we do not find 
any relationship between pricing multiples and future abnormal returns. We believe that the 
most likely explanation of the surprising results after the start of the financial crisis is our 
specific sample period. Since the 1920s, value stocks have massively outperformed growth 
stocks on average. However, growth stocks have outperformed value stocks during several 
sub-periods. It may be the case that the period 2008-2015 is just one of the few sub-periods 
where value stocks do not outperform growth stocks. We believe that the decrease in the risk-
free interest rate from normal to record low levels after the financial crisis offers the best 
explanation of the surprising results. Holding all other variables constant, growth stocks 
should outperform value stocks in this environment, as growth stocks are more sensitive to 
changes in the cost of capital. We have also found evidence indicating that decreased liquidity 
has affected both the CAPM and Fama-French alphas, as we do not control for liquidity using 
the Fama-French factors.  
We have also investigated why the low EV/FCFF portfolio outperformed the other low 
multiple portfolios during the whole period. Our analysis indicate that investors have penalized 
companies making large investments over the last couple of years. The low EV/FCFF 
companies may have outperformed the other companies due to their very low net investment 
rates. 
Low Medium High
Market cap 9,920 33,128 21,049
Enterprise value 11,698 39,721 26,335
Growth rate 16 % 15 % 20 %
ROIC 18 % 16 % 13 %
Tax rate 24 % 29 % 29 %
WACC 8.1 % 8.2 % 8.1 %
EBIT 1,770 7,618 3,616
FCFF 1,361 2,439 650
Net investment rate -1 % 55 % 75 %
Observations 170 170 169
Characteristics for the EV/FCFF portfolios
The variables are obtained by taking a simple mean for each portfolio using yearly observations. All variables 
except market cap and enterprise value are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Please see the appendix 
(section 11.12) for a complete description of the abbreviations in this table. The “growth rate” is the 5-year 
average growth rate in revenues. Enterprise value market capitalization, EBIT and FCFF are measured in millions. 
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7. Robustness  
7.1 Overview 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by comparing alternative assumptions and 
methodologies. All the tables in this chapter show Fama-French alphas using value-weighted 
returns for the whole period (2000-2015). As the EV/FCFF multiple is the only multiple that 
seems to predict abnormal returns, our focus will be to test the robustness of that conclusion. 
We use the Fama-French model to show that the EV/FCFF premium is not only due to 
exposure to the Fama-French factors. 
7.2 33 vs. 20 percentile 
Instead of dividing the stocks into three equally sized portfolios based on the value of the 
pricing multiple, we could divide them into the following portfolios: 
 The stocks with the 20 percent lowest pricing multiples in one portfolio (low) 
 The stocks with the 20 percent highest pricing multiples in another portfolio (high) 
 The remaining 60 percent of the stocks in a third portfolio (medium) 
Table 19: 33 vs. 20 percentile 
 
  
3 portfolios EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.130 0.143 0.685** 0.169 0.255 -0.319
Medium 0.180 0.161 0.269 -0.0887 0.176 0.119
High -0.448* -0.370 0.194 -0.0926 0.0403 -0.0363
Long-short 0.577 0.513 0.491 0.262 0.215 -0.283
20-60-20 portfolios EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.229 0.277 0.635* 0.396 1.062*** -0.708*
Medium -0.0357 -0.0389 0.453** 0.183 -0.0710 0.0578
High -0.605 0.186 -0.250 -0.481 0.223 0.0460
Long-short 0.834 0.0904 0.884* 0.877 0.838 -0.754
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 is run for each portfolio and the 
alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage terms and value-weighted returns are used. There 
are 172 monthly observations between 2000 and 2015.  H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance level, ** = 5 % 
significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicate that the portfolio yield positive 
significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is significant negative. 
 
 75 
As we can see from the table above, there are some differences between the 3 equally sized 
portfolios and the 20-60-20 portfolios. Using the 20-60-20 portfolios, low P/FCFE yields a 
significant positive alpha, while low P/B yields a significant negative alpha. P/FCFE is one of 
the most unstable measures as the alpha changes a lot when we change our assumptions. For 
the 20-60-20 portfolios, low P/FCFE do not yield a significant alpha for the equally weighted 
returns for instance. Hence, we do not find P/FCFE a good predictor of future returns. Using 
the 20-60-20 portfolios, the long-short strategy based on EV/FCFF yields a significant positive 
alpha. Changing the portfolio cut-off strengthens our conclusion that the EV/FCFF multiple 
predicts future abnormal returns. 
7.3 Financial firms  
Our main sample excludes 67 financial firms. The largest financial firms on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange are DNB, Storebrand and Gjensidige Forsirking. In Figure 5, we saw that an index 
with financial firms marginally outperformed the index without financial firms.  
Table 20: With and without financial firms 
 
The table above shows portfolios formed with and without financial firms. As expected, the 
difference is not very large. Using the sample including financial firms, low P/B yields a 
significant negative alpha, while the long-short strategy using EV/EBITDA yields a significant 
positive alpha. Including or excluding financial firms, low EV/FCFF is still the best 
performing portfolio. 
Without financial firms EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.130 0.143 0.685** 0.169 0.255 -0.319
Medium 0.180 0.161 0.269 -0.0887 0.176 0.119
High -0.448* -0.370 0.194 -0.0926 0.0403 -0.0363
Long-short 0.577 0.513 0.491 0.262 0.215 -0.283
Financial firms EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.212 0.149 0.665** 0.317 0.388 -0.505**
Medium 0.147 0.140 0.260 0.0405 0.0954 0.169
High -0.438* -0.375 0.131 -0.293 0.0744 -0.0536
Long-short 0.650* 0.524 0.534 0.610 0.314 -0.451
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 is run for each portfolio and the 
alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage terms and value-weighted returns are used. 
There are 172 monthly observations between 2000 and 2015. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance level, 
** = 5 % significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicate that the portfolio yield 
positive significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is significant 
negative. 
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7.4 Fama-French Factors 
In our analyses until now, we have used the Fama-French factors created by us. To test the 
robustness of these factors, we have downloaded similar factors for the Norwegian market 
constructed by Ødegaard (2015a). These factors are not updated after June 201226. Thus, we 
compare the results for the period 2000-2012.   
Table 21: Ødegaard’s Fama-French factors 
 
As we can see from the table above, the results are very similar. The main difference is that 
the alpha of the low EV/EBITDA portfolio goes from being significant at a 10% level to being 
insignificant using the Fama-French factors constructed by Ødegaard. EV/FCFF remains the 
best performing low multiple portfolio. 
  
                                                 
26 While this text have been prepared, Ødegaard has updated the HML and SMB factor.  
Our Fama-French factors EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.354* 0.338 0.648* 0.554** 0.577 -0.344
Medium 0.105 0.242 0.157 0.0514 0.165 0.244
High -0.559* -0.644** 0.0862 -0.440 -0.148 -0.0678
Long-short 0.913** 0.982** 0.562 0.995** 0.725 -0.276
Ødegaard Fama-French factors EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.362 0.358 0.782* 0.679** 0.502 -0.307
Medium 0.145 0.115 0.144 -0.0408 0.0398 0.227
High -0.667** -0.614** 0.0398 -0.539 -0.00537 -0.115
Long-short 1.029** 0.972** 0.742 1.218** 0.507 -0.192
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 is run for each portfolio and the alphas 
are collected. All variables are measured in percentage terms and value-weighted returns are used. There are 
141 monthly observation between 2000 and June 2012. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance level, ** = 5 % 
significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicate that the portfolio yield positive 
significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is significant negative. 
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7.5 Market values from year-end  
Fama & French (1992a, 1993, 1996, 1998) use market capitalization and enterprise value from 
December year t-1 in their multiples. We use market capitalization from June year t. Below, 
we have compared the two different approaches.  
Table 22: Market values from year-end 
 
Most of the portfolios perform better using market values from December year t-1 than June 
year t. Low EV/FCFF now gets an alpha of 0.907%, significant at the 1% level.  Using market 
values from December year t-1, the long-short strategy using EV/EBITDA and EV/FCFF 
yields significant positive alphas. 
These results indicates that it is better to use market values from December year t-1. Based on 
our arguments in section 3.5, we find this very surprising. We believe that updated market 
values from June year t will be better predictors of returns from July year t to June year t+1 
than outdated market values from December year t-1. 
7.6 Sample  
In order to be included in the portfolios, we needed both market data and accounting data. For 
some accounting variables such as book value and earnings per share, we have data for almost 
all the firms. On the other hand, Bloomberg only provided FCFE and FCFF for relatively few 
companies, as you can see from Table 3. Therefore, the good performance of the EV/FCFF 
multiple could be due to a biased sample. In section 6.3, we showed that that all EV/FCFF 
Market values from June EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.130 0.143 0.685** 0.169 0.255 -0.319
Medium 0.180 0.161 0.269 -0.0887 0.176 0.119
High -0.448* -0.370 0.194 -0.0926 0.0403 -0.0363
Long-short 0.577 0.513 0.491 0.262 0.215 -0.283
Market values from December EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.242 0.230 0.907*** 0.299 0.280 -0.146
Medium 0.120 0.125 0.233 -0.122 0.309 0.291*
High -0.680** -0.301 -0.00676 -0.309 -0.170 -0.347*
Long-short 0.923** 0.531 0.914* 0.609 0.450 0.201
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  is run for each portfolio and the 
alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage terms and value-weighted returns are used. There 
are 172 monthly observations between 2000 and 2015. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance level, ** = 5 % 
significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicate that the portfolio yield positive 
significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is significant negative. 
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portfolios yielded higher gross returns than the market. This illustrates that the companies with 
a valid EV/FCFF multiple are not a representative sample of the stocks on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. 
Table 23: EV/FCFF sample 
 
Using the EV/FCFF sample for all multiples, low EV/FCFF is still the only low multiple 
portfolio with a significant positive alpha. Buying low P/E and selling high P/E now gives a 
positive abnormal return. EV/FCFF remains the best selection tool if you want do identify 
stocks with positive abnormal returns. 
7.7 Summary 
Our results seem quite robust to changes in assumptions. No matter what kind of assumption 
we test, investing in stocks with a low EV/FCFF multiples yields positive abnormal returns 
and is the best selection tool for finding “winners”. In addition, a long-short strategy using 
EV/FCFF yields positive abnormal returns in two of the five robustness tests. Hence, the 
robustness tests seem to strengthen our conclusion that the EV/FCFF multiple predicts 
abnormal returns. 
Ordinary sample EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.130 0.143 0.685** 0.169 0.255 -0.319
Medium 0.180 0.161 0.269 -0.0887 0.176 0.119
High -0.448* -0.370 0.194 -0.0926 0.0403 -0.0363
Long-short 0.577 0.513 0.491 0.262 0.215 -0.283
EV/FCFF sample EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.140 0.146 0.685** 0.287 0.151 -0.230
Medium 0.379 0.435 0.269 -0.355 0.633** 0.164
High -0.467 -0.394 0.194 -0.675* -0.145 -0.270
Long-short 0.607 0.540 0.491 0.962* 0.296 0.0399
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  is run for each portfolio and the 
alphas are collected. All variables are measured in percentage terms and value-weighted returns are used. There 
are 172 monthly observations between 2000 and 2015. H0: α=0, Ha: α≠0, * = 10 % significance level, ** = 5 % 
significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The colour green indicate that the portfolio yield positive 
significant abnormal return, while the colour red indicates that the abnormal return is significant negative. 
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8. Sources of Error  
8.1 Period 
We investigate stocks in the period 2000-2015 using monthly data. Compared with other 
master theses on the subject, 15 years of data is quite much. Engeberg & Enge (2009) used 9 
years of data, while Lofoll (2009) used 10 years of data. As discussed earlier, the bad 
performance of stocks with low multiples could be due to the sample period. Only time will 
show whether the change around the financial crisis was permanent or just temporary. 
8.2 Transaction cost and taxes 
In our analysis, we have not taken into account transaction costs or taxes. Transaction costs 
occur when you buy and sell stocks. Non-financial institutions have to pay brokerage 
commission to the broker. For small investors, commission for buying and selling is on 
average 2.23% and 2.76 % of the share price respectively (Døskeland, 2014). As we can see 
in Table 28 - Table 30, the number of stocks bought and sold each year is quite high. In addition 
to broker commission, you also face a bid-ask spread. According to Døskeland (2014), these 
are on average 0.94% of the share price.  
Figure 8: Stock bought or sold in each portfolio - EV/EBIT 
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The figure shows the sum of the number of stocks bought and sold each year in each 
portfolio. Delisted companies are not included as stocks sold.  
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As illustrated above, the number of stocks sold and bought each year in the different portfolios 
are almost the same, resulting in similar size of the transaction costs. The picture is not very 
different for the other multiples.  
For private Norwegian investors, the tax on capital gains and dividends is 27 %. However, if 
you invest trough a corporation you do not have to pay tax on stock investments in Norway, 
but then losses are not tax-deductible cf. skatteloven. 
As we have seen, transaction costs will have a significant effect on the return you get. 
Adjusting for transaction costs may erode the positive abnormal returns for all the portfolios. 
As stated by Cochrane, avoiding taxes and transaction costs is therefore an important task for 
a portfolio manager: “The most important piece of portfolio advice applies as much as ever: avoid 
taxes and transaction costs” (Cochrane, 1999). 
8.3 Delisted companies 
Companies that got delisted were given a return of zero for the rest of the portfolio year (July 
year t to June year t+1). If a company is delisted in August, it gets zero return until June the 
following year. A more realistic assumption would have been that the money was reinvested 
in other stocks. 
The problem with delisted companies (no return after delisting) and transaction costs work in 
opposite directions. Delisted companies were not a problem for the Fama-MacBeth analysis, 
since companies that become delisted were removed from the sample at once and not at the 
end of the portfolio year.  
8.4 Data snooping bias 
In this thesis, we examine the performance of six multiples. The chance that one of the 
multiples will outperform the market just by chance is definitely present. Analysing enough 
multiples you would probably end up with a multiple that yields abnormal returns. Our choice 
of multiples was not based on results, but on data availability, earlier research, popularity 
among investors and whether the multiples were theoretically well founded or not. We believe 
that our selection method in combination with several robustness tests makes the results less 
affected by data snooping bias. 
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8.5 Adjusting for risk 
As we have discussed, there is no universally agreed upon asset-pricing model to measure the 
cost of equity. In this thesis we try to find a relationship between multiples and abnormal 
returns. Hence, the measure of the cost of equity is very central. To make our results more 
robust, we have risk adjusted our returns using both the CAPM and the Fama-French model. 
However, we may not have controlled for all the risk, making the EV/FCFF premium a 
consequence for risk and not a consequence of mispricing as suggested in this thesis. 
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9. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have examined whether pricing multiples predict abnormal returns for stocks 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We analysed all available companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
in the period 2000-2015. Using the method introduced by Fama-MacBeth and a portfolio 
approach, we investigated six different multiples: EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/FCFF, P/E, 
P/FCFE and P/B.  
To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first to analyse the relationship between pricing 
multiples and future abnormal returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange using the following period, 
multiples and methodology: 
 Including the period 2010-2015 
 Using the EV/FCFF and P/FCFE multiples. 
 Using the Fama-MacBeth regression method 
During the whole period, only EV/FCFF seems to predict CAPM and/or Fama-French 
abnormal returns. This result is very surprising. Almost all studies find that EV/EBITDA, 
EV/EBIT, P/E and P/B predict CAPM abnormal returns. In search of an explanation of this 
surprising result, we divided the whole period (2000-2015) into two sub-periods, one period 
before the start of the financial crisis in 2008 and one period after.  
During the period before the start of the financial crisis (2000-2008), the results are closer to 
our expectations and more in line with prior research. In this period, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, 
EV/FCFF and P/E seem to predict CAPM abnormal returns. These results are in line with Basu 
(1977) and Fama & French (1992a). EV/FCFF also seems to predict Fama-French abnormal 
returns. As expected, a lower multiple was associated with higher abnormal returns.  
Thus, the surprising results for the whole period stem from the period after the start of the 
financial crisis (2008-2015). During this period, none of the multiples seems to predict 
abnormal returns. Only the EV/FCFF multiple comes close. In this period, growth stocks (high 
multiples) actually performed marginally better than value stocks (low multiples). These 
results are quite astonishing. It is an established truth in finance that value stocks (e.g. low 
P/B) provide positive CAPM abnormal returns. Most of the academic community use an asset-
pricing model based on this notion. If this turns out to be a spurious relationship, it will have 
great implications for portfolio managers following a strategy of buying stocks with low 
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multiples. It will also have great implications for researchers and practitioners using the Fama-
French three-factor model to estimate the cost of capital. 
We believe that the most likely explanation of the surprising results in the period after the start 
of the financial crisis is our specific sample period. Since the 1920s, value stocks (low 
multiples) have massively outperformed growth stocks (high multiples) on average. However, 
growth stocks have outperformed value stocks during several sub-periods. It may be the case 
that the period 2008-2015 is just one of the few sub-periods where value stocks do not 
outperform growth stocks. We believe that the decrease in the risk-free interest rate from 
normal to record low levels after the financial crisis offers the best explanation of the 
surprising results. Holding all other variables constant, we show that growth stocks should 
outperform value stocks in this environment, as growth stocks are more sensitive to changes 
in the cost of capital. 
We also investigate why the low EV/FCFF portfolio outperformed the other low multiple 
portfolios during the whole period. Our analysis indicate that investors have penalized 
companies making large investments over the last couple of years. The low EV/FCFF 
companies may have outperformed the other companies due to their very low net investment 
rates.  
We believe that our thesis is relevant and could have value due to two factors. Frist, we believe 
that we are the first to include the period 2010-2015 in an analysis of the relationship between 
pricing multiples and future abnormal returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We found that the 
historical relationship between pricing multiples and future abnormal returns have faded away 
during this period. Second, we believe that we are the first to investigate the EV/FCFF multiple 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The EV/FCFF multiple is the only multiple that seems to predict 
CAPM and/or Fama-French abnormal returns during the whole period (2000-2015). As 
expected, a lower EV/FCFF multiple was associated with higher abnormal returns. For the 
other multiples we did not find a clear relationship between the value of the multiple and future 
abnormal returns. 
These results indicate that portfolio managers should be wary of basing a portfolio strategy on 
buying stocks with low multiples. They also indicate that portfolio managers that do base their 
strategy on buying stocks with low multiples should consider using the EV/FCFF multiple as 
a selection tool. This is the first thesis were you could extract these results on the Oslo Stock 
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Exchange. Thus, we believe that this thesis could have value for portfolio managers that invest 
in the Norwegian stock market. 
We believe that the most likely explanation of our surprising results is our specific sample 
period (2000-2015). Thus, we would encourage further studies of pricing multiples on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange in the future to investigate whether our surprising results are due to a 
permanent shift in the abnormal returns for value stocks or due to our specific sample period. 
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11. Appendix 
11.1 Tables and figures 
Figure 9: Oslo Stock Exchange vs. Brann 
 
 
  
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
150
100
200
300
400
500
600
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
B
ra
n
n
’s
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
 in
 "
Ti
p
p
el
ig
ae
n
"
O
sl
o
 B
en
ch
m
ar
k 
In
d
ex
Oslo Benchmark Index Brann’s position in "Tippeligaen"
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BRANN in “Tippeligaen”. 
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Table 24: Dickey-Fuller test 
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Table 25: Autocorrelation 
 (1) 
 uhatPE 
laguhatPE 0.0114 
 (0.0758) 
  
RfOSEBX -0.000740 
 (0.0474) 
  
Constant 0.0242 
 (0.266) 
Observations 171 
R2 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 (1) 
 uhatEVEBIT 
laguhatEVEBIT -0.0145 
 (0.0796) 
  
RfOSEBX -0.00122 
 (0.0398) 
  
Constant 0.0177 
 (0.232) 
Observations 171 
R2 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 is run and the residuals are saved. Then the residual in time 
t (monthly observations) is regressed against the market (OSEBX) and the residual in time t-1. A significant 
intercept is sign of autocorrelation.  
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Table 26: Fama-MacBeth without adjusting for autocorrelation 2000-2015 
 
 
  
2000-2015 Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf Ri-Rf
0.0961 -0.122 -0.302 -0.334 -0.978 -0.440
(0.459) (0.477) (0.666) (0.488) (0.599) (0.446)
-0.433**
(0.182)
-0.561***
(0.140)
-0.281*
(0.145)
0.120
(0.123)
0.0265
(0.136)
0.229
(0.194)
Constant 1.312** 2.084*** 1.842*** 0.596 1.401** 0.816*
(0.591) (0.546) (0.618) (0.548) (0.691) (0.439)
Observations 16042 13942 5941 13970 8982 22944
R-squared 0.051 0.054 0.087 0.053 0.073 0.049
Beta
Log(EV/EVEBITDA)
Log(EV/EVEBIT)
Log(EVFCFF)
Log (P/E)
Log (P/FCFE)
Log (P/B)
The cross section of monthly excess return measured in percentage terms is regressed against 
the beta of the stock and the multiple. Only stocks that have a positive multiple and have been 
traded for two years are included in the sample. The return is measured from July year t to June 
year t+1, the accounting variable is from year t-1. The market cap and the enterprise value in 
the multiples are from start of the month. * = 10 % significance level, ** = 5 % significance 
level, *** = 1% significance level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
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Table 27: Fama-French betas and alphas for low multiple portfolios 
 
2000-2015 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
OSEBX 0.798*** 0.780*** 0.936*** 0.913*** 0.999*** 1.079***
HML 0.0361 0.0230 0.135 0.111* 0.168** 0.448***
SMB -0.110* -0.183** -0.130 -0.250*** 0.211** 0.158*
Alpha 0.130 0.143 0.685** 0.169 0.255 -0.319
2000-2008 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
OSEBX 0.820*** 0.821*** 0.796*** 0.859*** 1.037*** 1.144***
HML 0.157* 0.130 0.172 0.136 0.198 0.408***
SMB -0.155** -0.315*** -0.171 -0.255*** 0.220* 0.257**
Alpha 0.375 0.420 0.826* 0.401 0.603 -0.481
2008-2015 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
OSEBX 0.806*** 0.778*** 1.135*** 0.989*** 0.952*** 0.964***
HML -0.113** -0.109* 0.0305 0.0385 0.108 0.533***
SMB -0.00884 0.0666 -0.00393 -0.221 0.186 -0.0514
Alpha -0.449* -0.467* 0.482 -0.147 -0.248 -0.0427
The regression 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  is run for each 
portfolio and the alphas and betas are collected. There are 172 monthly observation between 
2000 and 2015, 92 between 2000 and 2008 and 80 between 2008 and 2015.  All variables are 
measured in percentage terms and value-weighted returns are used. H0: α/βi=0, Ha: α/βi≠0, * 
= 10 % significance level, ** = 5 % significance level, *** = 1% significance level. The alphas 
and betas are for the value-weighted portfolios.  
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Table 28: Stock bought and sold for low multiple portfolios 
 
 
Year EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
1999 23 23 8 29 20 39
2000 16 14 9 18 16 23
2001 17 18 5 18 14 27
2002 15 8 7 15 13 19
2003 9 9 6 8 11 14
2004 20 13 7 16 13 24
2005 14 11 9 20 6 23
2006 21 24 13 22 13 26
2007 15 16 9 24 11 35
2008 26 23 10 30 14 34
2009 20 18 12 17 18 31
2010 16 14 9 25 13 21
2011 20 11 10 16 12 20
2012 15 13 8 16 12 18
2013 11 11 11 13 15 18
2014 16 13 13 19 16 15
Year EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 10 9 1 14 4 13
2001 10 10 2 9 6 18
2002 11 6 1 10 7 9
2003 9 8 3 6 5 13
2004 8 3 2 5 4 13
2005 9 6 1 15 4 12
2006 10 11 5 17 2 19
2007 11 12 4 16 5 23
2008 14 10 2 19 4 28
2009 13 12 6 10 11 26
2010 9 10 2 17 5 18
2011 16 6 7 12 6 15
2012 9 6 3 8 3 11
2013 7 8 4 9 8 13
2014 13 9 5 13 10 11
Number of stocks bought
Number of stocks sold 
The tables show the number of stocks bought and sold each year in each portfolio. 
Delisted companies are not included as stocks sold.  
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Table 29: Stocks bought and sold for medium multiple portfolios 
 
 
 
Year EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
1999 22 22 8 29 20 39
2000 15 13 6 15 13 17
2001 18 22 5 15 13 16
2002 17 14 8 14 11 14
2003 11 10 7 11 7 11
2004 18 13 8 15 13 16
2005 19 16 8 21 7 19
2006 23 23 13 21 14 20
2007 20 19 9 24 9 28
2008 28 27 8 27 14 30
2009 21 21 8 17 15 20
2010 18 18 12 22 12 14
2011 22 20 11 19 14 11
2012 19 15 8 21 15 14
2013 18 16 10 15 18 9
2014 19 14 13 15 19 8
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 9 6 1 9 3 8
2001 9 14 2 10 6 9
2002 12 10 1 3 5 9
2003 8 8 1 3 3 4
2004 10 7 3 4 4 7
2005 12 6 5 5 4 7
2006 12 12 4 6 3 12
2007 10 9 4 8 4 14
2008 16 17 4 10 4 16
2009 18 16 4 14 5 17
2010 16 15 5 11 6 12
2011 18 14 5 8 4 5
2012 14 9 4 8 6 8
2013 14 13 5 7 7 8
2014 14 10 5 7 6 5
Number of stocks bought
Number of stocks sold 
The tables show the number of stocks bought and sold each year in each portfolio. 
Delisted companies are not included as stocks sold.  
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Table 30: Stocks bought and sold for high multiple portfolios 
 
 
  
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
1999 22 22 8 29 19 39
2000 17 15 7 6 15 9
2001 12 19 4 9 14 9
2002 12 13 9 8 10 11
2003 10 8 6 5 8 9
2004 21 16 8 4 14 11
2005 13 16 8 11 8 16
2006 23 23 11 12 11 12
2007 21 20 9 9 11 11
2008 26 23 8 19 14 20
2009 20 16 9 10 18 20
2010 20 18 13 12 13 11
2011 22 19 9 14 13 13
2012 22 20 6 10 14 9
2013 17 18 11 12 15 8
2014 17 16 9 10 17 8
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 5 7 3 9 20 19
2001 9 15 0 9 18 16
2002 6 8 3 4 15 15
2003 4 4 4 2 12 9
2004 6 4 3 4 20 14
2005 6 7 4 7 19 20
2006 7 6 1 3 22 21
2007 3 1 6 8 27 14
2008 7 7 3 11 34 26
2009 17 15 2 15 24 14
2010 13 13 5 11 14 20
2011 11 8 4 11 14 17
2012 12 6 1 9 13 17
2013 15 13 6 7 11 15
2014 12 10 3 10 10 19
Number of stocks bought
Number of stocks sold 
The tables show the number of stocks bought and sold each year in each portfolio. 
Delisted companies are not included as stocks sold.  
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11.2 Shiller P/E 
The cyclically adjusted P/E ratio seems to be a good tool to identify the fair value of the S&P 
500 index: 
Figure 10: Cyclical adjusted P/E 
 
The lower green line represents a cyclically adjusted P/E of 10x, while the upper red line 
represents a cyclically adjusted P/E of 20x. Historically, it has been wise to buy the S&P 500 
index when the cyclically adjusted P/E is below 10x, and sell the index when the cyclically 
adjusted P/E is above 20x. 
However, unadjusted earnings per share seem to explain more of the short-term variation in 
the price of the S&P 500 index: 
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Figure 11: Unadjusted P/E 
 
Based on the graphs above, the cyclically adjusted earnings per share seems to be a good 
indicator of the value of the index, while the unadjusted earnings per share seems to be a good 
indicator of the short-term price of the index. This indicates that investors tend to focus too 
much on the volatile current earnings 
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11.3 DCF 
In the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation approach, you value an asset by discounting 
the expected future cash flows (CFt) at the appropriate discount rate (k). Assuming that the 
asset’s cash flow is growing at a constant rate (g), the DCF-value of the asset (P) is given by 
the following equation: 
𝑃0 = ∑
𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
= ∑
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑡−1
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
Writing the terms of the equation above gives equation 1: 
𝑃0 =
𝐶𝐹1
(1 + 𝑘)
+
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
(1 + 𝑘)2
+
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
2
(1 + 𝑘)3
+ ⋯ +
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑛−1
(1 + 𝑘)𝑛
 
Multiplying equation 1 by (1+k) on both sides gives equation 2: 
𝑃0 ∗ (1 + 𝑘) = 𝐶𝐹1 +
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
(1 + 𝑘)
+
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
2
(1 + 𝑘)2
+ ⋯ +
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑛−1
(1 + 𝑘)𝑛−1
 
Multiplying equation 1 by (1+g) on both sides gives equation 3: 
𝑃0 ∗ (1 + 𝑔) =
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
(1 + 𝑘)
+
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
2
(1 + 𝑘)2
+
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
3
(1 + 𝑘)3
+ ⋯ +
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑛
(1 + 𝑘)𝑛
 
Subtracting equation 3 from equation 2 gives: 
𝑃0 ∗ (1 + 𝑘) − 𝑃0 ∗ (1 + 𝑔) = 𝐶𝐹1 −
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑛
(1 + 𝑘)𝑛
 
Simplifying the equation above on both sides gives: 
𝑃0 ∗ (𝑘 − 𝑔) = 𝐶𝐹1 ∗ [1 − (
1 + 𝑔
1 + 𝑘
)
𝑛
] 
Dividing by (k-g) on both sides gives a simplified expression for the value of the asset: 
𝑃0 =
𝐶𝐹1 ∗ [1 − (
1 + 𝑔
1 + 𝑘)
𝑛
]
𝑘 − 𝑔
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Assuming that 𝑘 > 𝑔 and 𝑛 → ∞ gives the well-known Gordon’s growth formula: 
𝑃0 =
𝐶𝐹1
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
11.4 Derivation of enterprise multiples 
In this sub-chapter, we will derive the key value drivers of the enterprise multiples investigated 
in our thesis. The derivations are based on the derivations in Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 
(2010). 
Assuming that the company’s cash flow is growing at a constant rate, the DCF-value of the 
company is given by the well-known Gordon’s growth formula derived above (substituting 
FCFE for CF and WACC for k): 
𝐸𝑉𝑡 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 − ∆𝑂𝑝𝑊𝐶𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
Where: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡 = Enterprise value year t 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 = The Free Cash Flow to the Firm year t+1 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = The Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
𝑔 = The long-term growth rate in the FCFF 
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) = Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes year t+1 
𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 = The Depreciation and Amortization year t+1 
∆𝑂𝑝𝑊𝐶𝑡+1 = The Change in Operating Working Capital year t+1 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 = The Capital Expenditure year t+1 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 = The increase in Invested Capital from year t to year t+1 
The formula is only valid for 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 > 𝑔. 
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The net investment rate (IR) is defined as the proportion of NOPLAT invested back into the 
business. 
𝐼𝑅𝑡+1 =
∆𝑂𝑝𝑊𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 − 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
 
We can now define FCFF as a function of NOPLAT and the net investment rate: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 − (𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑅𝑡+1) 
The Return on Invested Capital is defined as the return the company earns on each dollar 
invested in the firm. 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑡+1 =
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡
 
The Return on New Invested Capital is defined as the return the company earns on each dollar 
of new investments. 
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑡+1 =
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+2 − 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
=
∆𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
 
In the following, we will assume that RONIC is constant. Multiplying both sides of the RONIC 
equation by 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 and dividing by 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 gives: 
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
=
∆𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
 →  𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑔 
Solving for 𝐼𝑅𝑡+1 gives: 
𝐼𝑅𝑡+1 =
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
 
Inserting this expression into the FCFF expression yields: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
) 
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Finally, inserting this expression into the Grodon’s growth formula gives the key value driver 
formula: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡 =
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
EV/EBIT 
Dividing the key value driver formula with EBIT yields the key value driver formula for the 
Enterprise value-to-EBIT multiple: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1
=
(1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
(1 − 𝑡) ∗ (
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 )
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
(1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
∗
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑔
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
(1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑔
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
− 1] =
(1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
] 
 
EV/EBITDA 
To get the key value driver for the Enterprise value-to-EBITDA formula, we rewrite the key 
value driver formula to: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡 =
[𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1 − 𝐷𝐴𝑡+1] ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
Dividing this expression by EBITDA and using similar algebraic steps as for the EV/EBIT 
formula yields: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
=
(1 −
𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
) ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
= [
(1 −
𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡+1
) ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
] ∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
] 
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EV/FCFF 
Dividing the Grodon’s growth formula with FCFF yields the key value driver formula for the 
Enterprise value-to-FCFF multiple: 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
=
1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
11.5 Derivation of equity multiples 
In this sub-chapter, we will derive the key value drivers of the equity multiples investigated in 
our thesis. The derivations are based on the derivation in Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2010). 
Assuming that the company’s cash flow is growing at a constant rate, the DCF-value of the 
equity is given by the well-known Gordon’s growth formula: 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
Where 𝑃𝑡 is the value per share year t. 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 is the Free Cash Flow to Equity per year t+1, 
𝑘 is the cost of equity, and 𝑔 is the long-term growth rate in earnings per share. 
Substituting earnings per share (E) with NOPLAT and Return on New Equity investments 
(RONE) with RONIC, we derive the key value driver formula for equity: 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
Where 𝐸𝑡+1 is the earnings per share year t+1 and 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 is the Return On New Equity 
investments. 
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P/E 
Dividing the key value driver formula by the earnings per share yields the key value driver 
formula for the price-to-earnings ratio: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡+1
=
(1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
(
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 )
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑔
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑔
𝑘 − 𝑔
− 1] =
1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
] 
 
 
P/FCFE 
Dividing the Gordon’s growth formula by the Free Cash Flow to Equity per share yields the 
key value driver formula for the price-to-FCFE ratio: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+1
=
1
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
P/B 
Dividing the key value driver formula by the book value per share (B) yields the key value 
driver formula for the price-to-book ratio: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
=
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸)
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 ∗ (
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 )
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑔
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸
∗ [1 +
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
] 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 is the Return on Equity defined as: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 =
𝐸𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡
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If we assume that the ROE is constant and equal to RONE, the key value driver simplifies to: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
= 1 +
𝑅𝑂𝐸 − 𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
From this equation we notice that P/B should be greater than one if 𝑅𝑂𝐸 > 𝑘, and less than 
one if 𝑅𝑂𝐸 < 𝑘. 
It is possible to show that if the company’s cash flow grow at a constant rate and the ROE is 
constant and equal to RONE, there is a perfect linear relationship between the P/B ratio and 
the ROE: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
= 1 +
𝑅𝑂𝐸 − 𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝑘 − 𝑔
𝑘 − 𝑔
+
𝑅𝑂𝐸
𝑘 − 𝑔
−
𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑔
= − (
𝑔
𝑘 − 𝑔
) + (
1
𝑘 − 𝑔
) ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸 
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11.6 Leverage 
The company’s capital structure (debt-to-equity ratio) will affect both the return on equity 
(ROE) and cost of equity (k).  
Return on Equity (ROE) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
= 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒕) − 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒕) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸
 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
=
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑡)
𝐼𝐶
 
𝑘𝑑 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 =
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
=
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐷
 
𝑡 = 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Solving the equations above for net income, EBIT(1-t) and Interest expense, and inserting 
these expressions into the “net income” expression above gives: 
𝑹𝑶𝑬 ∗ 𝑬 = 𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪 ∗ 𝑰𝑪 − 𝒌𝒅 ∗ 𝑫 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒕) 
𝐼𝐶 = 𝐸 + 𝐷 
Inserting this equation for IC, and dividing both sides of the equation by E gives the following 
equation: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 ∗ (
𝐸 + 𝐷
𝐸
) − 𝑘𝑑 ∗
𝐷
𝐸
∗ (1 − 𝑡) 
Collecting the (D/E) terms gives a formula showing the capital structure affect the ROE: 
𝑹𝑶𝑬 = 𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪 +
𝑫
𝑬
∗ [𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪 − 𝒌𝒅 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒕)] 
This formula clearly illustrates that the capital structure (D/E) affects the return on equity. 
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Cost of Equity (k) 
Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2010) show that the cost of equity is affected by the company’s 
capital structure. They start with Modigliani & Miller’s postulation saying that the market 
value of a company’s economic assets, such as operating assets (𝑉𝑢) and tax shields (𝑉𝑡𝑥𝑎), 
should equal the market value of its financial claims, such as debt (𝐷) and equity (𝐸): 
𝑽𝒖 + 𝑽𝒕𝒙𝒂 = 𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 = 𝑫 + 𝑬 
Then, they refer to a second result of Modigliani & Miller saying that the total risk of the 
company’s economic assets must equal the total risk of the financial claims: 
𝑽𝒖
𝑽𝒖 + 𝑽𝒕𝒙𝒂
(𝒌𝒖) +
𝑽𝒕𝒙𝒂
𝑽𝒖 + 𝑽𝒕𝒙𝒂
(𝒌𝒕𝒙𝒂) =
𝑫
𝑫 + 𝑬
(𝒌𝒅) +
𝑬
𝑫 + 𝑬
(𝒌𝒆) 
Where: 
𝑘𝑢 = 𝑢𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑘𝑡𝑥𝑎 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
′𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 
𝑘𝑑 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑘𝑒 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
Multiplying both sides of the equation above by the enterprise value gives: 
𝑉𝑢 ∗ (𝑘𝑢) + 𝑉𝑡𝑥𝑎 ∗ (𝑘𝑡𝑥𝑎) = 𝐷 ∗ (𝑘𝑑) + 𝐸 ∗ (𝑘𝑒) 
Subtracting 𝐷 ∗ (𝑘𝑑) from both sides of the equation and dividing by 𝐸 gives: 
𝑘𝑒 =
𝑉𝑢
𝐸
(𝑘𝑢) +
𝑉𝑡𝑥𝑎
𝐸
(𝑘𝑡𝑥𝑎) −
𝐷
𝐸
(𝑘𝑑) 
From the first equation, we know that 𝑉𝑢 = 𝐷 + 𝐸 − 𝑉𝑡𝑥𝑎. Inserting this expression for 𝑉𝑢 in 
the equation above gives: 
𝑘𝑒 =
(𝐷 + 𝐸 − 𝑉𝑡𝑥𝑎)
𝐸
(𝑘𝑢) +
𝑉𝑡𝑥𝑎
𝐸
(𝑘𝑡𝑥𝑎) −
𝐷
𝐸
(𝑘𝑑) 
 
 110
Collecting terms gives the general equation for the cost of equity: 
𝒌𝒆 = 𝒌𝒖 +
𝑫
𝑬
(𝒌𝒖 − 𝒌𝒅) −
𝑽𝒕𝒙𝒂
𝑬
(𝒌𝒖 − 𝒌𝒕𝒙𝒂) 
If the company has a target capital structure (i.e. a target D/E ratio), the value of debt will 
fluctuate with the enterprise value. If we assume that the cost of debt is relatively constant, 
which is reasonable when the debt-to-equity ratio is constant, the interest expense and 
consequently interest tax shield will also fluctuate with the enterprise value. In this situation, 
it is reasonable to assume that the cost of capital for the company’s interest tax shield is equal 
to the unlevered cost of equity. Then, the last term in the equation drops out, and the equation 
for the cost of equity becomes: 
𝒌𝒆 = 𝒌𝒖 +
𝑫
𝑬
(𝒌𝒖 − 𝒌𝒅) 
This formula clearly shows that the capital structure (D/E) affects the cost of equity.  
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11.7 Bloomberg variables 
In this section, we define the most central variables retrieved from Bloomberg. The definitions 
are from Bloomberg – how they define these variables.    
“Total return gross dividend” is used as the measure of return; this includes 
dividends and adjust for changes in the number of stocks. As Fama-French (1992a, 
1993, 1996, 1998), we use discreet returns.  
We obtained adjusted betas  𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝛽𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ×
2
3
+ 1 ×
1
3
. Bloomberg calculate the 
betas using weekly returns for two years and the OBX index as the market. The adjusted beta 
is an estimate of a securities future beta. Evidence suggest that stock’s beta move towards that 
of the market, hence they converge towards one (Wright).   
The variables used in the multiples are defined as follows:   
Market capitalization (Market cap) = Total value of a company’s outstanding shares. 
Enterprise value = Market cap + preferred equity + minority interest + total debt – cash & 
equivalent.  
Book value = Total common equity according to the balance sheet.  
Net income = Earnings per share before extraordinary items x number of shares. 
EBITDA = Earnings before interest expenses, income taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
EBIT = Earnings before interest expenses and income taxes. 
FCFF = Operating cash flow (net income + depreciation & amortization + other noncash + 
changes in non-cash working capital) - capital expenditures + interest expenses*(1-effective 
tax rate). 
FCFE = Cash flows from operating (net income + depreciation & amortization + other noncash 
+ changes in non-cash working capital)  + capital expenditures/property additions + disposal 
of fixed assets + increase/decrease ST borrowings + net change in LT debt (cash flow) + 
increased preferred stock- total cash preferred dividends.  
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11.8 Gross return 
Table 31: Gross return for the value-weighted portfolios (2) 
 
 
In the table above, all value-weighted portfolios with annualized gross returns higher than the 
market (OSEBX) are marked with green. Except from the P/B multiple, buying portfolios with 
low multiples yielded higher gross returns than the market for the whole period (2000-2015). 
Dividing the whole period in a period before the start of the financial crisis (2000-2008) and 
a period after the start of the financial crisis (2008-2015) reveals huge differences in the 
relative gross return (compared with the market). In the period before the financial crisis, all 
portfolios with low multiples yielded higher gross returns than the market. In the period after 
the financial crisis, only low EV/FCFF yielded a higher gross return than the market. Except 
from P/B, the gross returns falls as you go from the low multiple portfolio to the high multiple 
portfolio in the first period. In the second period, this is just the case for the EV/FCFF multiple. 
We notice that all EV/FCFF portfolios yielded higher gross returns than the market in both 
sub-periods. This indicates that the companies with a valid EV/FCFF multiple is not a 
representative sample of the stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
EV/FCFF seems to be the best selection tool based on the gross returns. It is the only multiple 
with a clear relationship between the value of the multiple and future gross returns in all 
periods. This is in line with what we found after correcting for risk. Hence, EV/FCFF seems 
to be the best selection tool to predict both gross and abnormal returns. Below, we show a 
graph of the cumulative return for the value-weighted EV/FCFF portfolios. By examining the 
09.2000-01.2015 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 8,7 % 8,8 % 16,1 % 9,7 % 10,1 % 4,9 %
Medium 9,3 % 8,2 % 9,8 % 5,2 % 8,0 % 8,7 %
High 0,9 % 1,7 % 8,3 % 4,7 % 6,6 % 5,2 %
OSEBX 7,4 % 7,4 % 7,4 % 7,4 % 7,4 % 7,4 %
09.2000-05.2008 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 18,7 % 19,2 % 24,4 % 19,0 % 21,7 % 11,8 %
Medium 9,8 % 10,1 % 14,2 % 11,1 % 10,8 % 17,5 %
High 4,6 % 3,2 % 12,0 % 2,5 % 6,2 % 7,4 %
OSEBX 11,6 % 11,6 % 11,6 % 11,6 % 11,6 % 11,6 %
05.2008-01.2015 EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low -1,7 % -2,0 % 7,2 % -0,1 % -1,9 % -2,5 %
Medium 8,8 % 6,1 % 4,9 % -1,2 % 4,8 % -0,6 %
High -3,3 % 0,0 % 4,2 % 7,3 % 7,1 % 2,7 %
OSEBX 2,8 % 2,8 % 2,8 % 2,8 % 2,8 % 2,8 %
The gross return is computed as the annualized geometric average return. All portfolios with 
annualized gross return higher than the market (OSEBX) are marked with green. 
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graph, we can clearly see that low EV/FCFF has been a much better investment than OSEBX. 
Investing NOK100 in OSEBX and low EV/FCFF in 2000 have resulted in a wealth of 
NOK279 and NOK845 in 2015 respectively. 
Figure 12: EV/FCFF cumulative return for the value-weighted portfolios 
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11.9 R-squared  
It may also be interesting to examine the r-squared of the different regressions. In the table 
below, you can see the r-squared for the different portfolios using both the CAPM and the 
Fama-French model.  
Table 32: R-squared 
 
The Fama-French regressions have a slightly higher r-squared. Including more explanatory 
variables, always make the r-squared higher so that is not surprising. Both the CAPM and 
Fama-French model seems to explain the returns quite well. For the low, medium and high 
multiple portfolio, the r-squared varies from 0,650 to 0,882 using the CAPM, and from 0,660 
to 0,882 using the Fama-French factors. The results for the equally-weighted portfolios are 
quite similar.  
  
CAPM EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.803 0.756 0.650 0.756 0.656 0.772
Medium 0.806 0.749 0.754 0.781 0.743 0.882
High 0.822 0.771 0.706 0.693 0.650 0.823
Long-short 0.141 0.057 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.053
Fama-French EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/FCFF P/E P/FCFE P/B
Low 0.809 0.768 0.660 0.777 0.670 0.828
Medium 0.807 0.752 0.757 0.789 0.752 0.882
High 0.826 0.772 0.709 0.708 0.660 0.843
Long-short 0.170 0.083 0.025 0.086 0.066 0.308
The regressions 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 −
𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖  are run for each portfolio and the r- squared are collected. The R-squared are for the value-weighted 
portfolios. There are 172 monthly observations between 2000 and 2015. 
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11.10 Risk-free rate 
In this section, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that the that the long-term growth rate 
and return on new equity investments have stayed constant, while the risk-free rate has 
decreased in the period after the start of the financial crisis. 
In the long term, the risk-free interest rate should converge on the nominal growth rate of the 
economy (Damodaran, 2012). Thus, it is inconsistent to assume that a company (Growth) will 
continue to grow at a rate of 4% per year if the risk-free interest rate (and nominal GDP 
growth) decreases from 5% to 3%. Then, the company (Growth) would eventually become 
larger than the world economy in which it operates. This is obviously not possible. Below, we 
show the historical relationship between the yield on 10-year US government bonds and 10-
year nominal GDP growth in the US. We do not find any relationship between the yield on 
10-year government bonds and the future 10-year nominal GDP growth: 
Figure 13: Yield and future growth 
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However, we find a very strong relationship between the yield on 10-year government bonds 
and past 10-year nominal GDP growth: 
Figure 14: Yield and past growth 
 
In other words, the risk-free rate seems to describe the past nominal growth, not the future 
nominal growth. Thus, we cannot use the risk-free rate as a good predictor of future economic 
growth. When the risk-free rate is low (high) it is often because the central banks respond to 
low (high) economic growth.  
IMF does not seem to believe in a very low nominal growth rate over the next couple of years. 
In the graph below, we show IMF’s estimate of the historical and future real GDP growth rate 
for the world economy. As we can see from the graph, IMF seem to believe in a real growth 
rate slightly higher than the historical average. 
Figure 15: IMF real growth 
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In the table below, we show IMF’s estimate of the historical and future inflation rate for the 
world economy. As we can see from the graph, IMF seem to believe in an inflation rate close 
to the historical average. As the nominal GDP growth is the sum of the real growth rate and 
the inflation rate, IMF seem to predict a nominal growth rate slightly higher than the historical 
average.  Thus, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the long-term growth rate has 
stayed constant in the period after the start of the financial crisis, even though the risk-free rate 
has decreased. 
Figure 16: IMF inflation 
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It is natural to assume that the return on new equity investments will decrease when the cost 
of equity decreases. Consider a company with an investment opportunity generating a return 
on equity of 10%. The company should not make the investment if the cost of equity is 15%. 
However, it should make the investment if the cost of equity is 5%. Below, we show that the 
continuous decrease in the yield on 10-year US government bonds since the early 1980s has 
not affected the return on equity for companies included in the S&P 500 index:  
Figure 17: Return on equity 
 
The return on equity should only gradually converge to the return on new equity investments. 
However, we believe that we should be able to observe a decline in the return on equity after 
35 years of decline in the risk free rate if the return on new equity investments decreases when 
the interest rate decreases. Thus, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the return on 
new equity investments have stayed constant in the period after the start of the financial crisis, 
even though the risk-free rate has decreased. 
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11.11 IFRS 
In 2002, The European Union decided that all companies listed on a stock exchange should 
follow the IFRS standard for financial reporting from 2005 (ICAEW, 2015). The main 
difference between IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standard) and the previously used 
NGAAP (Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) is that IFRS values debt and 
assets to “fair value”, while NGAAP use historical cost. Beisland & Knivslå (2015) find that 
the transition to IFRS decreases the gap between market values and book values. When it 
comes to earnings, their conclusion is not that clear, but they expect that the use of IFRS will 
result in a weaker relationship between returns and earnings. 
Even though Beisland & Knivslå argues that the introduction of IFRS have changed the 
relationship between accounting variables and the return on stocks, their study does not outline 
the consequences for value (growth) strategies. The change in the accounting rules in 2005 
would first affect the value (growth) portfolios from July 2006. If the introduction of IFRS is 
the reason for the change in the return of value stocks compared to growth stocks, the change 
must have come in July 2006 and not after the financial crisis as first suggested. 
Figure 18: HML Norway 
 
The figure above shows the 12 months rolling average of the HML factor for the Norwegian 
market. The figure indicates a structural shift in the HML factor after the introduction of the 
IFRS. However, if we do the same analysis for the US market, which did not change to IFRS, 
we see the same structural shift, indicating that the picture is more complex.  
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Figure 19: HML USA 
 
To analyse the effect of IFRS on value strategies more carefully, we have downloaded HML 
factors from Kenneth French’s data library for 14 countries27 that changed the accounting rules 
to IFRS in 2005, and 6 countries28 that did not change their rules. Using a difference-in-
difference approach, we analyse the returns for the 12 months before and after the introduction 
of IFRS.  
  
                                                 
27 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
28 USA, Japan, Singapore, Canada, Hong Kong and Switzerland 
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We do the following regression: 𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2Treatment +  𝛽3TreatmentxTime +
𝜖𝑖, where  𝛽3 shows the average effect of introducing IFRS. Below, you can see the regression 
results.  
 
Table 33: Difference-in-difference IFRS 
 (1) 
 HML 
Time 0.0469 
 (0.453) 
  
Treatment -0.0664 
 (0.459) 
  
TreatmentxTime -0.171 
 (0.612) 
  
Constant 0.461 
 (0.361) 
Observations 456 
R2 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
The coefficient of TreatmentxTime is not significant. Thus, we cannot explain the 
outperformance of growth stocks relatively to value stocks using IFRS even though the 
coefficient is negative. We do not find evidence for that the introduction of IFRS has affected 
the relationship between P/B and future returns. 
Our analysis is simple and small and assumes that there are no changes other than the 
introduction of IFRS around the cut-off date in 2006 – which is quite strict. In addition, we 
only look at one multiple. Use of more countries and a narrower period would make the results 
less affected by potential bias. A more detailed analysis of the IFRS effect lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
  
The regression 𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑥𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜖𝑖 
is run. The  𝛽3 shows the treatment effect. HML is measured in percentage terms.  
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11.12 Abbreviations 
B = Book value of equity per share 
CAPE = Capital adjusted price to earnings ratio 
Capex = Capital expenditure 
CAPM = The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
DA = Depreciation and amortization  
DCF = Discounted cash flow 
CF = Cash flow 
E = Earnings per share = EPS 
EBIT = Earnings before interest and taxes 
EBITDA = Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization 
EV = Enterprise value 
EV/EBIT = Enterprise value to earnings before interest rate and taxes. 
EV/EBITDA = Enterprise value to earnings before interest rate, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization.  
EV/FCFF = Enterprise value to free cash flow to firm 
FCFE = Free cash flow to equity per share 
FCFF = Free cash flow to firm 
g = Long-term growth 
Growth portfolio = High multiple portfolio 
Growth stocks = Stocks with a high value of a pricing multiple 
HML = The return of low P/B firms minus high P/B firms 
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IR = Net investment rate.  
k = cost of equity 
Market cap = Market capitalization 
NOPLAT = Net operating profit less adjusted taxes 
OpWC = Operating working capital 
P = Value per share 
P/B = Price to book value per share 
P/E = Price to earnings per share 
P/FCFE = Market capitalization to free cash flow to equity 
ROE = Return on equity 
ROIC = Return on invested capital 
RONE = Return on new equity investment  
RONIC = Return on new invested capital 
SMB = The return of small firms minus the return of big firms 
Value portfolio = Low multiple portfolio 
Value stocks = Stocks with a low value of a pricing multiple 
WACC= Weighted average cost of capital 
WML = The return of last period winners minus the return of the losers 
